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Did You Give the Government Your
Baby’s DNA? Rethinking Consent in
Newborn Screening
Sonia M. Suter*
ABSTRACT
Newborn screening (NBS) has long offered the possibility of
identifying rare conditions, which can be lethal or debilitating if
not detected and treated quickly in the newborn period. These
screening programs, usually mandatory, have been well
established in every state since the 1960s. In the last decade, the
number of conditions screened for has risen exponentially to
include more than fifty inborn errors of metabolism, blood
disorders, genetic, or other conditions. Not surprisingly,
newborn screening programs have been widely accepted for their
potential to save the lives of countless children.
Despite their valuable public health benefits, however, old
approaches to, and more recent expansions of, NBS raise
important privacy and policy concerns. NBS samples are
collected in most states without affirmative, or sometimes any,
consent from parents. NBS programs now screen for an everbroadening range of diseases—sometimes without careful
assessment of the risks and benefits—including conditions for
which there is no treatment. NBS samples are retained for long
periods or indefinitely. And finally, few, if any, limits prevent
potentially invasive uses of these samples by the government or
third parties. Indeed, evidence suggests that a great deal of
research is being conducted on these stored blood spots, the
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collection and storage of which many parents are simply
unaware. Only a few lawsuits and legislatures have addressed
the legality of these practices.
With recent expansions in the scope of NBS and increased
interest in these samples for research, it is time to take a fresh
look at this long-standing public-health system and to reexamine
some of the underlying philosophies and practices associated
with it. While NBS offers important public health benefits, it
also threatens some of the civil liberties of the parents and
children involved. This piece argues for the need to strike a
careful balance between the public goods and private interests,
and describes a methodology that allows these competing values
to be recognized in policymaking. It concludes by suggesting
ways to balance the important values of maximizing the wellbeing of newborns and promoting research, while also protecting
autonomy and privacy as much as possible.
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INTRODUCTION
If you ask parents whether their child should undergo
genetic testing or participate in research, most would probably
say, consistent with legal norms in most areas of medicine,
“only with my consent!” Yet the majority of parents do not
realize that in every state, a small blood sample is collected
from newborns to test for inborn errors of metabolism (many of
which are inherited).1 Nor do they realize that, in many states,
1. See Taralyn Tan, Newborns’ DNA: Don’t Deny Scientists This Useful
Resource, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECH. NEWS (Apr. 13, 2010),
http://www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/newborns-dna-don-t-denyscientiststhis-useful-resource/4377 (“[I]n most cases, parents are not aware that the
blood sample from their child is being kept at all.”).
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the dried blood spots (DBS) are retained for long periods or
indefinitely, with few, if any, limits on third-party access to and
uses of these samples.2 Indeed, evidence suggests that a great
deal of research is being conducted on these stored blood spots
by the state and other entities.3 All of this, from collection to
retention of samples, often comes without parents’ affirmative,
let alone informed, consent.4
The impetus for mandatory newborn screening (NBS) is the
fact that rarely, but quite significantly, a child will be born with
abnormal levels of enzymes, metabolites, or other chemicals,
which can be lethal or debilitating if not detected and treated in
time.5 NBS offers the possibility of identifying some of these
conditions before clinical symptoms manifest and “before
developmental disabilities or death occurs.”6 These, usually
mandatory, screening programs have been well established in
every state since the 1960s, potentially saving the lives of
countless children.7 The scope of NBS programs has expanded
dramatically in recent years, with most states screening for
between twenty-seven8 and over fifty inborn errors of

2. See Lori Andrews, Public Choices and Private Choices: Legal
Regulation of Genetic Testing, in JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT
46, 55 (Timothy F. Murphy & Marc A. Lappé eds., 1994) (noting that genetic
information can change lives, “precipitated by the release of genetic
information to third parties—such as when insurers or employers make
adverse decisions against people based on genetic information”); Tan, supra
note 1 (discussing DNA warehousing and the indefinite retention of samples).
3. See, e.g., Tan, supra note 1 (“[S]torage . . . allows geneticists and
neonatology researchers access to an incredible genetic database. These blood
spot samples can be utilized to develop new genetic tests, to learn more about
existing genetic disorders, and to study factors such as the mother’s health and
in utero environment in relation to rare disorders.”).
4. Id.
5. See Newborn Screening, Pediatric Genetics, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/pediatricgenetics/
newborn_screening.html (last updated May 13, 2013) (discussing the
importance of newborn screening and the benefits derived from the process).
6. See Michael S. Watson et al., Newborn Screening: Toward a Uniform
Screening Panel and System, 8 GENETICS MED. 1S, 1S (Supp. May 2006)
(“States and territories mandate newborn screening of all infants born within
their jurisdiction for certain disorders that may not otherwise be detected
before developmental disability or death occurs.”).
7. Id. (discussing the importance of the state-based newborn screening
programs that began over forty years ago).
8. STEFAN TIMMERMANS & MARA BUCHBINDER, SAVING BABIES? THE
CONSEQUENCES OF NEWBORN GENETIC SCREENING 59 (2013) (“By 2010, all
states screened for 27 . . . conditions.”); Wylie Burke et al., Genetic Screening,
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metabolism.9 Some of these conditions have been added to the
list without careful assessment of the risks and benefits,10 and
some are identified and reported with no known effective
treatment.11
Even so, NBS has been a well-accepted part of our public
health system for nearly half a century.12 Recently, a few
lawsuits have challenged the consent requirements with respect
to NBS and related research. In 2003, a couple claimed that
Nebraska’s efforts to compel the screening of their newborn
violated their religious freedom and parental rights.13 The
Nebraska Supreme Court found no such violation.14

33 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVIEWS 148, 149 (2011) (“In the United States, most
states screen for at least 29 conditions . . . .”); see also ASSESSING GENETIC
RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 66 (Lori B. Andrews et
al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter AGR] (“Newborns are usually screened today for
several inborn errors of metabolism . . . .”).
9. See Louise Moody & Kubra Choudhry, Parental Views on Informed
Consent for Expanded Newborn Screening, 16 HEALTH EXPECTATIONS 239, 239
(2011) (mentioning that all states now screen for fifty-three core conditions to
detect inherited metabolic diseases). This range of conditions includes what are
described as twenty-nine core conditions and a secondary group of twenty-five
targets that can be identified by screening for the core set. TIMMERMANS &
BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 50, 63.
10. See Beth A. Tarini et al., Waiving Informed Consent in Newborn
Screening Research: Balancing Social Value and Respect, 148C AM. J. MED.
GENETICS 23, 23–24 (2008) (mentioning that “new NBS tests have rarely been
subjected to population-based study” and demonstrating the difficulties of
assessing risks and benefits).
11. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 58 (“Given the current state of
development of medical genetics, . . . effective treatment for genetic disorders
is rare . . . .”); Ellen Wright Clayton, Currents in Contemporary Ethics: State
Run Newborn Screening in the Genomic Era, or How to Avoid Drowning When
Drinking from a Fire Hose, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 697, 698 (2010) (noting that
for many of the reported results of newborn screening, “the efficacy and utility
of therapeutic and preventative interventions are not clear”).
12. Watson, supra note 6, at 1S.
13. See Douglas Cnty. v. Anaya, 694 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Neb. 2005)
(discussing the Anaya’s argument that the requirement violated their “First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion and their fundamental rights as
parents”).
14. Id. at 608 (concluding that the requirement did not “unlawfully burden
the Anayas’ right to freely exercise their religion” or “unlawfully burden their
parental rights,” mentioning the lack of evidence that the state had an antireligious purpose in enforcing the law and the valid policy interests in
addressing the health and safety of children born in Nebraska).
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The more recent “Baby DNA Lawsuits”15 have challenged
the involuntary collection and dissemination of NBS samples to
researchers for purposes other than NBS.16 In Minnesota, the
state Supreme Court ruled that the state’s dissemination and
use of newborns’ DBS for research without obtaining written
informed consent violated its Genetic Privacy Act.17 Two similar
lawsuits were brought in Texas. The state settled with the five
plaintiff parents in the first suit after agreeing to destroy all
samples collected without parental consent since 2002.18 A class
action filed in late 2010 in Texas was dismissed as moot
because there was no evidence that the parties’ newborn
samples were actually used or distributed for research.19
I argue in this Article that these lawsuits and other
developments in NBS should give pause to the presumption
that parental consent is not necessary with respect to NBS. We
already obtain much more information from NBS than we did in
the past and we are on the cusp of being able to obtain
substantially more information in the near future. Moreover,
the nature of the information we will be able to glean will be of
varied value, certainty, and complexity, raising issues not only
about what diseases we should screen for, but whether parents
should be required to consent to some or all parts of the NBS
process. In addition, the fact that newborn samples are
increasingly used for research, and that anonymization of
biospecimens is increasingly difficult, supports the need to
15. K.J. Mullins, Bill to Ban Unauthorized Use of Infant DNA Clears
Senate Committee, DIGITAL J. (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.digitaljournal.com/
article/287446.
16. See id. (pointing out that NBS samples are used for unauthorized
research).
17. Bearder v. Minnesota, 806 N.W.2d 766, 776 (Minn. 2011) (holding that
there is no authority in the statute to disseminate blood samples or genetic
information, without consent, “beyond that expressly authorized for the
reporting of newborn test results”). See generally MINN. STAT. §13.386 (2010)
(Minnesota’s Genetic Privacy Act).
18. See Higgins v. Tex. Dep’t of Health Servs., 801 F. Supp. 2d 541, 545–46
(W.D. Tex. 2011) (discussing the settlement of the earlier Beleno lawsuit, and
the agreement to “destroy all blood specimens taken as part of the newborn
screening program” prior to May 2009, for which no written consent existed);
Allison M. Whelan, Note, That’s My Baby: Why the State’s Interest in
Promoting Public Health Does Not Justify Residual Newborn Blood Spot
Research Without Parental Consent, 98 MINN. L. REV. 419, 430–31 (2013).
19. Higgins, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (“Plaintiffs never refute Defendants’
evidence that Plaintiffs’ children’s blood samples were not distributed and have
in fact been destroyed. Accordingly . . . their claims are now moot.”).
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rethink the role of consent in NBS, at least with respect to
storage and research uses of DBS. As I will argue, the case for
consent with respect to research also supports, in part, the
notion of consent for NBS itself.
Yet, just as changing circumstances provide reasons to
rethink parental consent with respect to NBS, the increasing
scope of information we can glean from NBS makes the
possibility of obtaining fully informed consent that much more
problematic logistically, practically, and economically. In
addition, the DBS are potentially valuable resources for
research that can benefit the common good, generally, and the
pediatric population, in particular. Thus, the question of
consent in NBS raises issues about how to strike the right
balance between the public good and private interests.
This Article offers a proposal for finding the right balance
of consent for NBS itself, and for the storage and use of DBS.
Part I offers a history of NBS and its evolution. Part II explores
the rationales for the limited consent provisions for NBS as well
as the growing practice of retaining these samples and using
them for purposes that go beyond the original goals of NBS.
Part III highlights the ways in which the public good comes into
conflict with the private interests and describes a methodology
that allows for these competing values to be recognized in
policymaking. It concludes by suggesting that requiring
affirmative consent for NBS and for research on DBS best
balances the values of protecting the newborn’s well-being and
promoting research, while also protecting autonomy and privacy
as much as possible.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF NEWBORN SCREENING

NBS begins with a heel prick and the collection of a few
drops of blood on filter paper, or Guthrie cards.20 It is a
preventive health measure that involves the analysis of the
newborn’s blood for various medical conditions, many of which
are inherited, including certain inborn errors of metabolism and

20. See AGR, supra note 8, at 39 (“This test could be performed on a spot of
blood obtained from a heel prick before the infant left the hospital nursery.”).
The Guthrie cards are named after Dr. Robert Guthrie, who developed the first
NBS assay for phenylketonuria. Clayton, supra note 11, at 697; Spotlight on
NBS Researchers, Robert Guthrie, MD, PhD, NEWBORN SCREENING
TRANSLATIONAL RES. NETWORK, https://www.nbstrn.org/about/spotlight/
Guthrie (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
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blood disorders.21 The value of conducting screening during the
newborn period is both practical and clinically significant. Most
infants are born in hospitals, which makes the systematic
collection of samples easier at this stage of life than nearly any
other.22 In addition, for many of the diseases screened,
treatment must be started in the newborn period to prevent the
development of clinical symptoms.23
As its name suggests, NBS is a screening program in which
an abnormal result does not necessarily identify the presence of
disease. It merely indicates an increased risk that the child has
the condition, necessitating confirmation through diagnostic
testing.24
With its inception nearly fifty years ago, NBS is the longest
program of genetic screening in the history of genetics.25 The
first state program screened for phenylketonuria (PKU), a
disease in which the child lacks a vital enzyme that breaks
down the amino acid, phenylalanine.26 Without this enzyme,
phenylalanine can accumulate in the brain, causing mental
retardation, unless the affected child eats a phenylalanine-free
diet.27 The first program, developed in Massachusetts, was

21. E.g., Newborn Screening, supra note 5.
22. See MARIAN F. MACDORMAN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HOME BIRTHS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1990–2009, at 1 (2012) (showing that only 0.72% of births took
place in the home in 2009).
23. E.g., Newborn Screening Tests, KIDSHEALTH, http://kidshealth.org/
parent/system/medical/newborn_screening_tests.html# (last visited Mar. 1,
2014) (“[E]arly diagnosis and proper treatment can make the difference
between lifelong impairment and healthy development.”); see also Clayton,
supra note 11, at 697 (discussing the policy behind newborn screening and the
rationale of “adding disorders to the newborn screening panel only if early
detection and treatment could avert serious harm”).
24. AGR, supra note 8, at 65 (“These screening tools are not definitive
diagnostic tests, however, and positive results must be confirmed through
specific testing for the disease in question.”).
25. See Nancy S. Green et al., Newborn Screening: Complexities in
Universal Genetic Testing, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1955, 1955 (“Newborn
Screening (NBS) is the first and largest example of systematic, populationwide
genetic testing . . . .”).
26. AGR, supra note 8, at 66.
27. See id. (stating that “high phenylalanine levels” can lead to mental
retardation, and that a phenylalanine dietary restriction is “highly effective in
preventing mental retardation”). The deficient enzyme is called phenylalanine
hydroxylase. Id.
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voluntary.28 This is in sharp contrast, as I will address in Part
II, to what is essentially mandatory screening in many states.
Most states do not require affirmative parental consent under
the theory either that the police powers justify this public
health measure or under the doctrine of parens patriae.29
While PKU was the primary disease screened for in the
early days of NBS, the panel of NBS diseases has expanded
considerably in the last few years. The initial expansion,
however, was quite slow, with only a few diseases added per
decade.30 As late as 2003, the number of diseases screened for in
most states was still quite low—eight or fewer diseases.31
Technological advances, however, changed that. While initial
NBS required a separate assay for each disorder, the
development of tandem mass spectrometry (MS/MS) in the
1990s allowed for the identification of over forty conditions
through a single test,32 contributing greatly to the expansion of

28. See Newborn Screening Task Force, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Serving
the Family from Birth to the Medical Home: Newborn Screening: A Blueprint
for the Future—A Call for a National Agenda on State Newborn Screening
Programs, 106 PEDIATRICS 389, 389 (2000) [hereinafter NBSTF] (“By 1962,
Massachusetts launched a voluntary newborn PKU screening program that
demonstrated the feasibility of mass genetic screening.”). Initially, “the
American Medical Association (AMA) and its state organizations opposed
mandatory screening as an infringement of physicians’ rights to regulate their
professional practice.” TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 38.
29. See infra Part II.A.
30. See Burke et al., supra note 8, at 149 (providing background
information on the expansion of NBS).
31. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-449, NEWBORN
SCREENING: CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PROGRAMS 2 (2003) [hereinafter
GAO], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03449.pdf (“While the
number of genetic and metabolic disorders included in state newborn screening
programs range from 4 to 36, most states screen for 8 or fewer disorders.”).
32. See Cecilia I. Kaye et al., Introduction to the Newborn Screening Fact
Sheets, 118 PEDIATRICS 1304, 1307, 1310 (2006) (discussing how MS/MS has
led to additional disorders added to screening panels and the essential role
played by pediatricians throughout the process). See generally Bridget Wilcken
et al., Screening Newborns for Inborn Errors of Metabolism by Tandem Mass
Spectrometry, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2304, 2309 (2003) (“It is now possible to
screen rapidly, simultaneously, and inexpensively for a number of very rare
disorders with the use of tandem mass spectrometry.”). Tandem mass
spectrometry screens for inborn errors of metabolism by measuring the levels
of various metabolites in the blood. Id. at 2305. Abnormalities in the levels of
these metabolites suggest the presence of metabolic disorders. Mary Ann Baily
& Thomas H. Murray, Ethics, Evidence, and Cost in Newborn Screening,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 2008, at 23, 25. MS/MS can also screen for
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NBS.33 After several years of much variability in screening
practices, a consensus began to emerge about the need for more
uniformity in NBS, especially with respect to screening
panels.34 The American College of Medical Genetics (ACMG)
issued recommendations for the standardization of the selection
of NBS diseases in 2005, which were endorsed by several
professional groups.35 Now every state tests or will test for a
minimum of twenty-nine conditions.36 Some panels include over
fifty disorders.37
As technologies allow us to test for more diseases more
efficiently, the question of what diseases should be included in
each state’s NBS panel remains difficult and, as we shall see
later, has some bearing on the question of whether parental
consent should be required. Among the relevant criteria are, of
course, scientific considerations, such as the prevalence of the
condition in the population, the validity of the NBS test, and
the efficacy of available treatments.38 But other non-scientific
considerations also play a vital role. Political concerns—such as

PKU and other amino acid disorders, but it does not allow for the testing of all
NBS disorders. Kaye et al., supra at 1310.
33. TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 17. Interestingly, in the
United Kingdom, “there was insufficient evidence and cost-effectiveness to
support tandem mass spectrometry technologies for newborn screening,”
whereas in the United States, these factors did not inhibit the use of this
technology because “cost-effectiveness is often neglected within health policy
discussions, due to cultural anxieties about healthcare rationing.” Id. at 58.
34. Id. at 34 (“The United States is one of only two industrialized countries
without a national newborn screening policy.”).
35. Id. at 50, 59. Although the report was one of the most controversial
reports on NBS issued by an advisory body, it was also one of the most
influential, in large part because it was strongly endorsed by such groups as
the March of Dimes Foundation; The American Academy of Pediatrics; the
Association of Women’s Health, Obstetric and Neonatal Nurses; and the
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Heritable Disorders in Newborns and
Children. Id. at 59.
36. Id. at 50; Watson et al., supra note 6, at 1S (“[T]he expert panel
identified 29 conditions for which screening should be mandated.”). I should
note that I was part of the panel.
37. Moody & Choudhry, supra note 9, at 239 (“All states in the USA now
screen for 53 core conditions . . . .”).
38. The “classical” criteria used by states in determining which conditions
to include in their NBS panels were derived from a seminal paper for the
World Health Organization by Wilson and Jungner. See Heather Harrell,
Currents in Contemporary Ethics: The Role of Parents in Expanded Newborn
Screening, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 846, 846–47 (2009) (discussing Wilson and
Jungner’s ten criteria to apply when considering population screening).
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the existence of advocacy groups39 and cost-benefit analysis40—
are also hugely influential. And, of course, ethical
considerations should and often do come into play.41 For
example, because the benefits to the newborn, to the family,
and to society do not necessarily overlap, decision makers must
decide whose benefits should determine the selection of the
screening panel.
If the goal of NBS is to benefit the newborn, the panel of
diseases should be limited to those for which we have effective
treatments or early intervention and whose natural history we
understand well. If we also consider the benefits to the family,
however, the panel of diseases might be broader because it
would include diseases with no treatment that might help
parents make better informed reproductive decisions about
39. In the context of NBS, parents have been strong advocates for
expanding the array of tests. Advocacy and lobbying have been strong forces in
the development and evolution of NBS. As Ellen Wright Clayton observes, NBS
laws were influenced more by individual practitioners and political groups
than anything else. Clayton, supra note 11, at 697–98 (discussing how most
programs in the United States were driven by a report endorsed by the
government committees and parent advocacy groups); see TIMMERMANS &
BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 39, 44–48, 59–61 (describing the powerful role of
advocacy in promoting NBS and its expansion).
40. See Harrell, supra note 38, at 846–47 (explaining that the criteria
when considering population testing boils down to screening “illnesses that are
sufficiently understood” and can be tested in a cost-effective manner). One of
the reasons PKU screening was so widely applauded was its high cost savings
of $93,000 per detected case. Report of the NIH Consensus Development
Conference on Phenylketonuria (PKU): Screening & Management: Chapter II,
NAT’L INST. CHILD HEALTH & HUM. DEV., https://www.nichd.nih.gov/
publications/pubs/pku/Pages/sub30.aspx (last updated Dec. 21, 2011). The costs
of screening per detected case, however, can sometimes be quite large. See
OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., HEALTHY CHILDREN: INVESTING IN
THE FUTURE 106–11 (1988) (demonstrating the variability in cost amongst
different screening and testing strategies). Some groups, such as the March of
Dimes, have taken the view that newborns should be screened regardless of
how rare the disorder is, in essence rejecting considerations of cost-benefit
OF
DIMES,
http://
analysis.
See
Newborn
Screening,
MARCH
www.marchofdimes.com/baby/newborn-screening.aspx (last visited Mar. 26,
2014) (expressing their desire for mandatory testing of extremely rare diseases,
most of which, but not all, can be treated or dealt with). This perspective is
more political or ethical than scientific, since it may not result in the greatest
health benefit to the community, though it is quite a sympathetic position from
the perspective of the individual families who benefit from such an approach.
See Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Health, State Health Department Receives
March of Dimes Award for National Leadership in Newborn Screening (Dec.
14, 2007) (lauding New York’s comprehensive NBS program).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 42–44.
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whether to undergo prenatal testing with future pregnancies.42
In addition, such information can avoid diagnostic odysseys,
when parents search long and hard for the diagnosis of a rare
condition.43 Finally, if we focus on the benefits to society, the
panel of diseases would be even larger, including conditions
about which we have limited knowledge and no effective
treatments so that we can identify potential research subjects to
learn more about the natural history of the disease.44
For some time, the consensus has been that the benefits to
the newborn should be decisive in selecting conditions for NBS
since the raison d’être of the program is to protect infants from
debilitating diseases.45 Despite this consensus, these criteria
have not always been followed in practice.46 Because state
health departments have substantial discretion to decide which
42. Many parents would seek prenatal testing with future pregnancies,
even if they did not plan to terminate affected pregnancies. Peter T. Rowley,
Parental Receptivity to Neonatal Sickle Trait Identification, 83 PEDIATRICS 891,
892 (1989) (noting that most women at risk for having a child with sickle cell
anemia wanted prenatal testing even though only one quarter would terminate
the pregnancy if the fetus were affected). But see Ranjeet Grover et al.,
Newborn Screening for Hemoglobinopathies: The Benefit Beyond the Target, 76
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1236, 1236–37 (1986) (reporting that fourteen out of
twenty-three women at risk for having a child with sickle cell anemia had an
amniocentesis and three of the four affected pregnancies were terminated).
Some have observed that this rationale for NBS makes it less about protecting
the newborn and more about eugenic goals of eradicating undesirable
conditions in the population. See, e.g., TWILA BRASE, CITIZENS COUNCIL ON
HEALTH CARE, NEWBORN GENETIC SCREENING THE NEW EUGENICS? THE CASE
FOR INFORMED CONSENT REQUIREMENTS FOR GENETIC TESTING, BABY DNA
STORAGE AND GENETIC RESEARCH 1 (2009), available at http://
www.cchfreedom.org/pr/NBS_EUGENICS_REPORT_Apr2009_FINAL.pdf.
43. Baily & Murray, supra note 32, at 28–29.
44. TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 51 (describing how
consideration of not just individual benefits, but also benefits to the family and
society is an example of “‘benefit creep’”).
45. See J.M.G. WILSON & G. JUNGNER, WORLD HEALTH ORG., PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE OF SCREENING FOR DISEASE 14 (1968) (stating that the aim of
early detection is to protect the individual). For a broader discussion and
criticism of the shift in focus of some NBS programs from benefit to the infant
to benefit to the family and society, see generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS, THE CHANGING MORAL FOCUS OF NEWBORN SCREENING: AN
ETHICAL ANALYSIS BY THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS (2008),
available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/newborn_screening/
index.html (discussing the shift from focusing primarily on what benefits the
infant to a “broader conception of benefit”).
46. See generally COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF INBORN ERRORS OF
METABOLISM, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., GENETIC SCREENING: PROGRAMS,
PRINCIPLES AND RESEARCH 228 (1975) (listing unacceptable aims of NBS).
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tests to include for NBS, there is little oversight.47 Even the
ACMG recommendations, which expressly declare that the
benefit to the newborn should drive the selection of disease,48
include a panel of diseases, not all of which directly or indirectly
benefit the newborn.49
Several factors have contributed to, and will likely further
contribute to, the expansion of NBS, not all of which directly
benefits the newborn. Technological advances, such as MS/MS,
have contributed to this expansion.50 Other technologies, like
DNA microarrays, will make it possible to screen for a slew of
genetic conditions.51 With the possibility of ever-cheaper whole
genome sequencing, it is not hard to imagine a time, in the not
too distant future, when NBS will be expanded to include whole
genome sequencing.52 Indeed, the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) recently funded pilot programs to “explore the promise—
and ethical challenges—of sequencing every newborn’s

47. See AGR, supra note 8, at 67 (stating that typically state health
departments have broad discretion to introduce tests, often with little
oversight, which can lead to testing for genetic conditions with little clinical
significance).
48. Watson et al., supra note 6, at 2S. The approach to selecting diseases
awarded points for clear benefits to family and society, as well as points for
individual benefits, which were weighted more heavily. TIMMERMANS &
BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 51–52.
49. Specifically the group proposed mandated screening for a panel of
twenty-nine conditions and suggested that an additional twenty-five be
reported to families. Watson et al., supra note 6, at 1S. Because there is no
treatment for some of these diseases, they did not meet the standard criteria
for NBS. Baily & Murray, supra note 32, at 26; Watson et al., supra note 6, at
1S; see also Jeffrey R. Botkin et al., Newborn Screening Technology: Proceed
with Caution, 117 PEDIATRICS 1793, 1796 (2006) (discussing the issues with
offering results for a large number of conditions for which limited or no
evidence of benefits exist).
50. This would not be the first time that medical diagnostics have been
driven as much or more by technology than by need. See Sonia Mateu Suter,
The Routinization of Prenatal Testing, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 233 (2002) (“A
product of the technology era, genetics has, in a short time, offered vast
amounts of information.”).
51. DNA microarrays allow researchers to analyze thousands of active
genes at a time, which could allow them to search for huge numbers of genetic
disease mutations at one time. DNA Microarray Technology, NAT’L HUM.
GROWTH RES. INST. (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.genome.gov/10000533.
52. See FRANCIS S. COLLINS, THE LANGUAGE OF LIFE: DNA AND THE
REVOLUTION IN PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 208 (2010) (“[It is] almost
certain . . . that complete genome sequencing will become part of newborn
screening in the next few years.”).
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genome.”53 This is consistent with the development of
personalized medicine and the belief that it is responsible and
empowering to get as much medical information as possible.54
So far, most of the expansions of NBS have been beneficial,
although the data about “long-term clinical outcomes” are
limited.55 The lives of many children, who might have died
years ago because their state did not screen for medium chain
acyl-coenzyme A dehydrogenase deficiency (MCADD), for
example, have been saved by the introduction of MCADD
testing in all states.56 Even so, the expansion of NBS is not
without costs. The more conditions we screen for, the greater
the risk of the inevitable artifacts of any screening program:
false negatives, false positives, and clinical and diagnostic
uncertainty. False negatives may create false reassurance and
slow the process of diagnosis; because pediatricians know that
NBS is done for all children, they may assume that the child
does not have one of the NBS diseases based on the negative
NBS result.57
False positives present the opposite problem.58 When a
child is reported as being positive for one of the NBS conditions,
53. Jocelyn Kaiser, NIH Studies Explore Promise of Sequencing Babies’
Genomes, SCI. MAG. (Sept. 4, 2013, 2:45 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/
biology/2013/09/nih-studies-explore-promise-sequencing-babies%E2%80%99genomes.
54. See Suter, supra note 50, at 233–34 (noting the strong desire to use
technology to get as much information as possible, but also cautioning that
knowledge can be toxic at times).
55. TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 184.
56. See Baily & Murray, supra note 32, at 23–24 (discussing Mississippi’s
response to MCADD and the benefits to its newborn population). However, not
all deaths due to MCADD have been eliminated with NBS. See TIMMERMANS &
BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 185.
57. False negatives can occur because of failures in the administration of
NBS: failure to perform the test properly, to record the results, or simply to
test. But false negatives can also occur even if everything is done correctly
because NBS is a screening test—it is not diagnostic. AGR, supra note 8, at 40.
False negatives may have become less of a problem in the last five to ten years,
but state health departments recognize the possibility of false negatives. ARIZ.
DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVS., ARIZONA NEWBORN SCREENING PROGRAM:
GUIDELINES 42–43 (2010), available at http://www.azdhs.gov/lab/aznewborn/
documents/providers/AZ-Newborn-Screening-Provider-Guidelines.pdf (revised
Jan. 2011).
58. False positives may result from errors in the testing process
(testing/analysis or reporting), but in general, false positives are an
unavoidable consequence of screening for extremely rare disorders. But like
false negatives, they are also inevitable artifacts of any screening program. The
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the family can experience a great deal of anxiety and confusion.
Some studies have shown that false positives can have an
adverse effect on the relationship between parent and child,
including parents’ continued worries about the child’s health
even after learning that she did not have the condition after
all.59 In addition, false positives may have a negative health
impact on the child by requiring follow-up testing and
treatment until it is determined that the child is unaffected;
further testing and treatment both pose potential medical
risks.60 Children who have false positive results are often
mislabeled as ill even though they do not display any clinical
symptoms.61
The recent and rapid expansion of NBS panels may also
result in the diagnosis of conditions for which there is no
treatment, which may create unnecessary stress and anxiety for
the family and affect the parent-child relationship. For
example, parents may pursue costly treatment odysseys, hoping
to find a cure even though no proven treatment exists.62 While
such information may help parents with future reproductive
decision making, this rationale moves NBS away from its stated
purpose of benefitting the newborn. Moreover, it undercuts the

incidence of false positives can be quite high. “Some states have a [positive
predictive value] of only 3%, meaning that 97% of infants who initially test
positive do not actually have the disease.” Whelan, supra note 18, at 438.
59. See K. Fyrö & G. Bodegård, Four-Year Follow-up of Psychological
Reactions to False Positive Screening Tests for Congenital Hypothyroidism, 76
ACTA PAEDIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 107, 107, 111 (1987) (finding that a
significant portion of families experienced persistent anxiety months and years
after false positives); James R. Sorenson et al., Parental Response to Repeat
Testing of Infants with ‘False-Positive’ Results in a Newborn Screening
Program, 73 PEDIATRICS 183, 185–86 (1984). One study also found that about
half of the children demonstrated difficulty adjusting psychologically to the
false positives as the mother-child relationship was negatively impacted. Karin
Fyrö & Göran Bodegård, Difficulties in Psychological Adjustment to a New
Neonatal Screening Programme, 77 ACTA PAEDIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 226,
229–31 (1988) (noting, however, that other factors may have played a role in
the dysfunction, which were unveiled by the NBS results).
60. Harrell, supra note 38, at 847–48 (describing the general concern and
her family’s experience with a false positive when her son was screened as a
newborn).
61. Id. at 847 (discussing the effects of a ten to one ratio of false positives
to true positives, coupled with a lack of visible symptoms, on parents’ decision
making, and the fact that false positives create the belief that the child is ill
and that it is neglectful not to proceed with additional testing).
62. See Baily & Murray, supra note 32, at 28–29.
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justification for the mandatory nature of NBS, as we shall see
in Part III.B.
Even more complicated issues arise when laboratories
make incidental findings of “abnormalities” or clinically
ambiguous findings.63 This problem has increased with tandem
mass spectrometry, which looks for a group of core conditions by
identifying unusually high levels of metabolites related to these
conditions.64 An artifact of this technology is the incidental
identification of elevated levels of certain metabolites, which the
laboratory was not even trying to identify,65 or the identification
of screening values that lie outside the normal range but that
do not always clearly correlate with defined disease
categories.66 These findings can lead to a new kind of diagnostic
odyssey, where children become, to use the terminology of
Timmermans and Buchbinder, “patients-in-waiting,” who hover
“for extended periods of time under medical attention between
sickness and health, or more precisely, between pathology and
an undistinguished state of ‘normality.’”67
Several problems arise when these incidental or
diagnostically uncertain findings are made and reported to

63. TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 12 (“Newborn screening
is a technology expected to provide actionable knowledge, yet it generates
uncertainty in the clinic . . . .”).
64. Baily & Murray, supra note 32, at 25 (“Tandem mass spectrometry
measures the levels of various metabolites in the blood, and abnormalities in
the levels suggest the presence of metabolic disorders.”).
65. TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 104 (describing the
identification of ACADM variants of unknown significance). Indeed, one of the
debated aspects of MS/MS is how many of the metabolic variants to report to
families. The ACMG proposed that in addition to a core panel of twenty-nine
conditions identified through MS/MS, twenty-five others should be disclosed to
families. See supra note 49. Some countries report only a limited number of
conditions identifiable through MS/MS. Clayton, supra note 11, at 697 (“Many
countries have chosen to report only a limited number of disorders detectable
by MS/MS . . . .”). The argument for this approach is that, if the family knows
about these conditions, they might avoid diagnostic odysseys. In addition, such
information might be useful for reproductive decision making, and following
such children might help us deepen our understanding of these conditions.
These arguments, however, depart from the traditional NBS philosophy by
placing societal benefits above the needs of the child. Baily & Murray, supra
note 32, at 28. On the other hand, not everyone wants such information and
there can be harm in receiving ambiguous information or information about
conditions for which there is no treatment. See Clayton, supra note 11, at 698
(“Some parents simply will not want all these results.”).
66. TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 65.
67. Id.
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parents. The child might be stigmatized as a “sick child” before
symptoms develop, if they ever will. This label has been shown
to have a harmful effect on the parent-child relationship and on
the family as a whole.68 Indeed, in some cases, the child might
never become clinically affected by the abnormal levels of the
metabolite or the mutation.69 There may be a considerable time
lag before physicians can determine whether high metabolites
or certain mutations are clinically significant, hence the phrase
“patients-in-waiting.”
Timmermans and Buchbinder’s ethnographic study of a
genetics clinic describes the complexities and anxieties that
such diagnostic uncertainties present and the ways in which
entire families are affected during this period.70 If families learn
of these findings, they might embark on treatment odysseys,
investing significant money and time in search of treatments
that may not exist or that are unproven. Sometimes the
heightened vigilance that parents exhibit during this period is
difficult to “tone down” once it becomes clear that the child is
not clinically affected.71 NBS programs may also spend added
dollars to report and follow up on conditions for which
treatments may not exist. It has also presented challenges for
clinicians who have to contend with the fact that expanded
screening has “identified more patients than anticipated,” most
of whom are asymptomatic, and which requires a collective

68. See supra note 59.
69. In fact, with little knowledge of the disease’s natural history, it is
difficult to know the rate of false positives or negatives or even, at times, to
determine whether there is a false positive or negative.
70. TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 65–96 (describing the
full experience of “patients-in-waiting” and their families).
71. Id. at 88 (“When, after time passed, the baby remained fine, clinicians
sometimes had trouble getting the parents to tone down their level of
vigilance.”); id. at 91 (“[W]hile geneticists could be ready to let the condition
fade away, family members could nevertheless perpetuate the medicalization
of their child.”); id. at 226 (“The most striking emotion we observed in the clinic
was anxiety, but parents also expressed shame, anger, and sadness.”). Even so,
“nearly all of the families in [Timmermans and Buchbinder’s] study regarded
the screening program favorably.” As one parent said, “[w]e would rather go
through 10 weeks of the hell we went through than a lifetime of having a
special needs child without having the opportunity to know from day one or
day five.” Id. at 219.
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learning process and the development of new knowledge to
determine who is truly affected.72
If NBS ultimately includes whole genome sequencing,
similar issues will arise on an even greater scale. We are
unlikely to fully understand for some time the clinical
implications of many mutations, let alone the complex
interactions of different mutations within a particular genome
and environment. In many instances, it will be difficult to
determine whether a genetic variant is likely to have a
significant clinical impact, or what the degree or timing of such
impact would be.73 As a result, whole genome sequencing would
likely provide a great deal of data of limited value, which could
increase parental anxiety and confusion.
Although the raison d’etre for NBS was to promote the
wellbeing of newborns, some of the expansions of NBS can only
be justified by other considerations, such as allowing parents to
make better informed reproductive decisions and benefiting
society by allowing us to better understand the conditions. The
more these other rationales are used to justify expansions of
NBS, the more we should question whether screening infants
without the consent of parents can be justified. I turn now to an
explanation for the enduring lack of consent in NBS before
discussing the issues of consent that arise with respect to the
storage and dissemination of newborn samples for research and
other uses.
II. THE LACK OF CONSENT IN NBS
Consent has long been absent in NBS, making it in essence
a mandatory screening program. Recently, the public and
scholarly communities have focused largely on the lack of
consent with respect to the storage and future uses of DBS. But
although the lack of consent with respect to the collection of
blood samples and screening itself has not been challenged as
strongly, there are reasons to question the presumption against
requiring consent for NBS itself. I begin by describing the
general rationales for lack of consent in NBS and then turn to
the practices with respect to storage and future uses before

72. Id. at 94–95; see id. at 119 (“[E]xpanded newborn screening has
prompted a tremendous knowledge explosion about rare metabolic
conditions.”).
73. Clayton, supra note 11, at 698.
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offering my recommendations, in Part III, regarding consent in
these two areas.
A. CONSENT (OR LACK THEREOF) FOR NEWBORN SCREENING
ITSELF
NBS is quite unusual in being one of the few areas where
the state can require medical testing of an individual or child
without affirmative consent.74 Even so, the mandatory nature of
NBS has long been well accepted with only minimal criticism.75
Although most states do not require affirmative parental
consent for newborn screening, there is some variability with
respect to what amounts to presumed consent. The majority of
states allow parents to opt out, although the reasons they allow
differ. Some will only allow parents to refuse for religious
reasons.76 Many will allow parents to opt out for any reason.77
At one extreme, NBS is mandatory without exception.78 One
state actually imposes criminal penalties for refusing to
undergo NBS.79 Even in states where there is an opt-out
provision, there is serious doubt as to whether parents truly
have an opportunity to refuse in these jurisdictions,80 making

74. Parents are generally allowed to refuse medical treatment or testing
on behalf of their child, unless their decision puts a child at grave risk. See
Andrews, supra note 2, at 59 (“Only when their decisions put their children at
grave risk are parental decisions overridden by the state.”).
75. See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 11, at 697 (discussing the rapid
development of the screening programs and stating that they “were almost
always mandatory, in response to advocacy by geneticists and parents”).
76. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-5-403 (2013) (allowing parents to opt out of
testing or medical treatment if they file a written statement that states such
tests or treatment conflict with their “religious tenets and practices”); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 253.13(3) (West 2010) (stating that the statute shall not apply “if
the parents or legal guardian of the child object thereto on the grounds that the
test conflicts with their religious tenets and practices”).
77. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 383.14(4) (West 2007) (“The provisions of
this section shall not apply when the parent or guardian of the child objects
thereto.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-6(A) (West 2011) (stating that parents, after
being informed of the reasons for the tests, may waive the requirements for the
tests in writing).
78. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5431 (West 2001); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 50-19-201 to -211 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-519 to -524 (2009); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-24-17 to -25 (2011); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-22-1 to -6 (2010).
79. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-37-30(G) (1991).
80. Ruth Faden et al., A Survey to Evaluate Parental Consent as Public
Policy for Neonatal Screening, 72 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1347, 1347 (1982)
(describing the screening as “compulsory for all practical purposes”).
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the provision “opt-out” more in name than practice. Only two
states require affirmative parental consent.81
Not only is a requirement of consent for NBS rare, but
parents are often woefully uninformed about NBS. Often states
provide limited information about the nature of NBS testing82
or that there is an option to opt out (when there is such an
option).83 Sometimes parents are not even informed that the
child will be tested.84 If a child tests positive through NBS,
parents often do not learn that the newborn screening results
are not diagnostic and that there may be false positives or
negatives.85 And many are not adequately educated about the
nature of the condition or offered genetic counseling, even when
the child tests positive.86
81. D.C. CODE §§ 7-831 to -840 (LexisNexis 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-801 to -802 (2013). In the last few years, Maryland switched from its opt-in,
informed consent approach, to an opt-out approach. See MD. CODE REGS.
10.52.12.07 (2013); Rachel L. Schweers, Newborn Screening Programs: How Do
We Best Protect Privacy Rights While Ensuring Optimal Newborn Health?, 61
DEPAUL L. REV. 869, 891 n.130 (2012). The rationale for this change was to
bring testing in line with the national Newborn Screening Taskforce, to be like
the vast majority of states, and to lighten the paperwork burden on hospitals
and providers because parental refusal is so rare. MD. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
MENTAL HYGIENE, 2008 LEGISLATIVE REPORT: SHOULD A COORDINATED
STATEWIDE SYSTEM FOR SCREENING NEWBORN INFANTS BE APPLIED TO ALL
NEWBORN INFANTS IN MARYLAND? 2–3 (2008).
82. See Schweers, supra note 81, at 869 (discussing the lack of knowledge
about screening policies amongst health care providers, and the need to initiate
a discussion in order to address concerns).
83. See, e.g., MD. CODE REGS. 10.52.12.07 (2013) (providing an example of
an opt-out regulation); Rachel Grob, Parenting in the Genomic Age: The ‘Cursed
Blessing’ of Newborn Screening, 25 NEW GENETICS & SOC’Y 159, 159, 163
(2006).
84. AGR, supra note 8, at 67 (stating that at this point, most parents
receive brochures or some general information at the time of screening,
although in many cases this is very thin, token information); see Terry C. Davis
et al., Recommendations for Effective Newborn Screening Communication:
Results of Focus Groups with Parents, Providers, and Experts, 117 PEDIATRICS
S326 (Supp. May 2006) (providing that one-third of patients in a study in
California never received NBS materials from their prenatal providers even
though California requires them to provide patients with such information);
Lisa A. Faulkner et al., The Newborn Screening Educational Gap: What
Prenatal Care Providers Do Compared with What Is Expected, 194 AM. J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 131 (2006).
85. AGR, supra note 8, at 65, 67.
86. See Clayton, supra note 11, at 697 (“While some people may value this
information, other parents who specifically chose not to have carrier screening
for themselves may be less pleased when they involuntarily learn their carrier
status from their child’s newborn screen.”).
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NBS laws and practices go very much against legal and
ethical norms in the United States, which recognize an
individual’s right to choose whether to undergo medical
treatment or testing and to refuse treatment even when it can
result in death.87 Not only is consent required for most medical
interventions and treatments,88 generally consent must be
informed.89
There is considerable irony in the fact that parental
decision making and education are so limited with NBS since it
is essentially a form of genetic screening. Mandatory genetic
testing is extremely unusual,90 in large part because a strong
consensus has existed for some time that genetic screening
programs should not be compulsory and should involve
informed consent.91 After all, genetics and especially genetic
counseling are among the disciplines in medicine most deeply
committed to individual autonomy in medical decision making
and informed decision making for genetic testing.92

87. The Supreme Court, in Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
269–70 (1990), discussed the long common law tradition of protecting bodily
integrity through battery actions and the informed consent doctrine, which is
now “firmly entrenched in American tort law.” Based on this common law
tradition, the court inferred that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition. See Winston v.
Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 753, 766 (1985) (holding the surgical removal of a bullet
from a defendant’s body was an unreasonable search violating the Fourth
Amendment); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1952) (holding that
evidence obtained through the forceful use of a stomach pump violated the Due
Process Clause).
88. Treating a patient or imposing some medical intervention without a
patient’s consent could easily be the basis for a battery claim. BARRY R.
FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 357–58 (5th
ed. 2004).
89. Id. at 357.
90. Andrews, supra note 2, at 58 (providing that some unfortunate
exceptions to this rule have included the mandatory testing for carriers of the
gene for sickle cell anemia); see AGR, supra note 8, at 40–42.
91. Faden et al., supra note 80, at 1347–48 (describing various policy
committees that have expressly rejected “public health justification[s] for
mandatory [genetic] screening” and noting that “[t]he Genetic Disease Title of
Public Law 94-278, which provides assistance in the establishment of genetic
testing and counseling programs, requires that the ‘participation by an
individual in any program or portion thereof under this part shall be wholly
voluntary’”).
92. See TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 19 (noting how
inconceivable it seems in “an era infused with bioethical concern about patient
autonomy and genetic discrimination” to screen “the overwhelming majority of
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NBS is not, however, the only example in which the state
has made medical decisions on behalf of individuals. The state
has intervened either to protect the well-being of the public or
the individual himself. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, for
example, the Supreme Court upheld the state’s right to
mandate its citizens to be vaccinated against smallpox.93 The
Court reasoned that vaccinating an individual against his will
did not violate the individual’s liberty interests.94 This was so
because a “community has a right to protect itself against an
epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its
members,”95 as long as the means of doing so are “reasonably
required for the safety of the public.”96 The court located the
state’s right to compel vaccination within its police powers
because it protects the public health97 by preventing the spread
of highly contagious smallpox.98 The state has also exercised its
police powers to impose medical treatment against a person’s
will when someone has been deemed mentally ill and a threat to
others.99 In both instances, the government intervenes to
prevent one individual from threatening physical danger or
harm to another.100 In spite of possessing these potentially
broad powers, the states have tended to be fairly limited in
using them.101

infants . . . for genetic conditions without informed consent”); Suter, supra note
50, at 242–43.
93. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38–39 (1905).
94. Id. at 27.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 28.
97. Id. at 24–25 (“The authority of the State to enact this statute is to be
referred to what is commonly called the police power—a power which the State
did not surrender when becoming a member of the Union under the
Constitution. [T]his court . . . has distinctly recognized the authority of a State
to enact quarantine laws and ‘health laws of every description;’ . . . . According
to settled principles, the police power of a State must be held to embrace, at
least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment
as will protect the public health and the public safety.”).
98. Id. at 35 (finding “strong support” for the view that vaccination is an
effective “means of protecting a community against smallpox”).
99. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 236 (1990).
100. Ellen Wright Clayton, Screening and Treatment of Newborns, 29
HOUS. L. REV. 85, 126 (noting that the police power “has historically been
invoked only to protect others from physical harm”).
101. Andrews, supra note 2, at 54 (noting, for example, that the government
has not tended to track people down with infectious diseases, quarantined
them, or forced them to undergo treatment, but observing that in some limited
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The mandatory nature of NBS has been justified by these
police powers because NBS is touted as a public health effort.102
In fact, however, NBS does not neatly fit into this model. NBS
screening is conducted primarily to prevent harm to the
individual who is being screened, rather than to prevent harms
to others.103 To be sure, identifying a child’s metabolic disorder
in time to provide treatment can minimize suffering for the
family overall, reduce societal health care costs, and expand
families’ reproductive options. These rationales, however, are
not typically what we think of as public health efforts of the sort
that justifies the police powers. Of course, if we conceive of the
public health more broadly as the public good, then this
justification is more powerful.
Even so, the better rationale for the mandatory nature of
NBS is the doctrine of parens patriae, which allows the state to
limit a person’s liberty to protect the individual.104 The basic
principle of this doctrine is to preserve human life.105 Although
there is a common law and constitutional presumption that
parents have the right to make medical decisions on behalf of
their children,106 the state can intervene if parental decisions
constitute abuse or neglect.107 Classic cases in which the state
cases people have been required to be tested to HIV infection if convicted of
certain crimes).
102. Faden et al., supra note 80, at 1347.
103. Whelan, supra note 18, at 435 (describing the police powers as
infringing “on individual rights primarily to protect the public from other
individuals’ actions or behaviors”).
104. STEVEN OLSON & ADAM C. BERGER, INST. OF MED., CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES IN USING RESIDUAL NEWBORN SCREENING SAMPLES FOR
TRANSLATIONAL RESEARCH: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 7 (2010) (“Newborn
screening programs are authorized through the legal doctrine known as parens
patriae, which gives the state the right to assume certain roles of parents
based on benefits to the child and to society as a whole.”); Clayton, supra note
100, at 126.
105. Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Del. 1991).
106. Id. at 1115–16 (“[T]he common law recognizes that the only party
capable of authorizing medical treatment for a minor in ‘normal’ circumstances
is usually his parent or guardian.”); e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
753 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
107. Newmark, 588 A.2d at 1116 (“[T]he State can intervene in the parentchild relationship where the health and safety of the child and the public at
large are in jeopardy.”); BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE
LAW AND ETHICS (6th ed. 2008); Lainie F. Ross, Predictive Genetic Testing of
Children and the Role of the Best Interest Standard, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
899, 901 (2013) (noting that in the United States, as compared with the United
Kingdom, the best interest standard tends to give “‘considerable deference to
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has successfully intervened include parental decisions to
withhold lifesaving transfusions or chemotherapy.108
The parens patriae justification for NBS is the urgent need
for early diagnosis of conditions for which early treatment can
reduce morbidity and mortality. It is further supported by the
fact that the risks of testing and treatment are generally
minimal. Thus, the argument goes, the state must intervene
because parental refusal to test for various inborn errors of
metabolism and other serious conditions could be potentially
life threatening or seriously debilitating by preventing an
affected child from being diagnosed during the newborn period.
The underlying presumption is that without a mandate, parents
will refuse to participate in NBS, leaving children undiagnosed
and therefore untreated for treatable conditions.109 Because
NBS fits better within a medical model—where the focus is the
risk/benefit calculus with respect to the individual—than a
public health model, the parens patriae justification is more
appropriate than the police powers rationale.
Even so, as some scholars pointed out in the earlier years of
NBS, and as is even truer now as NBS expands, the parens
patriae rationale is somewhat questionable for many reasons.
First, as I discuss in Part III, empirical data challenge the
presumption that a mandate is necessary to ensure that
newborns are screened. Second, definitive treatments are not
available for all of the conditions identified;110 a problem that
childrearing decisions made by parents or guardians, with state intervention
generally confined to instances of abuse or neglect’”) (citing Lainie F. Ross et
al., Technical Report: Ethical and Policy Issues in Genetic Testing and
Screening of Children, 15 GENETICS MED. 234, 236 (2013)); June Carbone,
Legal Applications of the “Best Interest of the Child” Standard: Judicial
Rationalization or a Measure of Institutional Competence 10 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (noting that, although “the treatment of
children starts with deference toward parental preferences” parental rights
“are not absolute”).
108. Andrews, supra note 2, at 59; Seema Shah, Does Research with
Children Violate the Best Interests Standard? An Empirical and Conceptual
Analysis, 8 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 121, 125, 156 (2013) (finding that courts
ordered blood transfusions over parental objections in all but two cases).
109. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MED. & BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, SOCIAL, AND
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC SCREENING, COUNSELING, AND EDUCATION
PROGRAMS (1983), available at http://kie.georgetown.edu/nrcbl/documents/
pcemr/geneticscreening.pdf.
110. See TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 183 (describing how
the genetics clinic saw many “symptomatic patients who did not seem to
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will likely grow as the panel of diseases expands. Third, in some
cases interventions can save lives, but the children still “face
significant developmental delays, frequent hospitalizations, and
serious risks of mortality.”111 Sometimes, newborn screening
may not occur in time to protect those at greatest risk.112 Given
the ongoing morbidity and mortality for many children screened
positive, some scholars predict that “the health payoff of
screening is likely to be lower than the number of true positive
might otherwise imply.”113
Even when treatments are available, the state often does
not actually provide treatment to the affected children; the
programs merely provide families with the information to seek
out treatment.114 The success of newborn screening in
preventing disease depends largely on day-to-day efforts to
manage the conditions and “the ability [of families] to tap into
available medical services and social resources,” which is as
much a function of socioeconomic factors as anything else.115 As
improve” and how “for the most severe disorders associated with the worst
outcomes . . . newborn screening [is] unlikely to make a difference in
outcomes”); Clayton, supra note 11, at 698 (“Other disorders are identified for
which there is no effective therapy.”).
111. TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 179; id. at 184 (“[S]ome
children did poorly despite the advance knowledge provided by newborn
screening.”); id. at 189 (describing conditions for which early interventions
“could prevent only some negative consequences”).
112. Id. at 162 (“[B]etween July 2005 and April 2009, 62 screen positive
infants died in California before follow-up care could be started in a metabolic
center.”); id. at 180 (“In some cases, newborn screening results arrived too late,
after a child had already sustained a devastating metabolic crisis and
permanent brain damage.”).
113. Id. at 216.
114. See Burke et al., supra note 8, at 152 (“Although most states provide
informational brochures, many parents are unaware that their infant has been
tested unless they are notified of a positive result.”); see also R. Rodney Howell,
We Need Expanded Newborn Screening, 117 PEDIATRICS 1800, 1802 (2006)
(“The facilities vary widely for such follow-up around the country, and it is
incumbent on the state programs to work in their regions to provide follow-up
support in terms of funding and organization.”). In such cases, we may simply
be labeling more children as ill without actually providing much clinical benefit
to many of these children, especially if parents are not adequately educated or
cannot afford the treatment. Moreover, it exacerbates concerns about whether
the resources devoted to NBS could be better used to address the urgent health
care needs of many children that have still not been met.
115. TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 195; see id. at 170, 194–
210 (describing the effects of insurance, access to transportation, language,
education and bureaucratic barriers on parents’ abilities to manage their
children’s metabolic conditions).
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a result, the state’s efforts work only partially toward the goal
of eliminating the deleterious effects of the diseases, leading
some to question whether the true motivation for mandatory
NBS is actually the well-being of the child.116
Finally, even if the state is motivated primarily by the wellbeing of each child, it is not clear that the risks are great
enough to justify state intervention. While many of the NBS
conditions could lead to grave, even life-threatening, harm if
undetected, these conditions are extremely rare. This means
that the probability that any one child who is not tested
through NBS will suffer a grave or life-threatening illness by
failing to undergo NBS is statistically quite low, although
clearly the magnitude of harm could be quite great.117 In
contrast, both the probability and magnitude of harm (death or
serious debilitation) in failing to provide blood transfusions or
chemotherapy, for example, will often be considerable.118 As
Professor Lori Andrews has noted, the risks of refusing NBS
screening “is far less than the risks inherent in many other
decisions that parents are routinely allowed to make,” such as
allowing their children to play on high school sports teams.119
Moreover, the probability of false positives is quite high; the
rate of false to true positives can be as high as, or higher than,
ten to one.120 As noted above, false positives are often not
inconsequential. They can potentially lead to psychological,

116. See Burke et al., supra note 8, at 151 (“However, growing test capacity
has led to calls to expand not only the number of disorders screened for but
also the goals of newborn screening.”). “In the past, . . . infrastructural
problems and healthcare costs had tempered enthusiasm for expanding
newborn screening, but the separation of the scientific issues from those
affecting healthcare delivery had the effect of decontextualizing the viability of
screening.” TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 55.
117. NBSTF, supra note 28, at 414.
118. Andrews, supra note 2, at 60. Of course, the calculus can often be
complicated by other factors. In Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del.
1991), for example, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that it was not
neglectful for parents to refuse chemotherapy treatment for their three-yearold child, who suffered from “an aggressive and advanced form of pediatric
cancer,” because the proposed treatment was “highly invasive, painful,
involved terrible temporary and potentially permanent side effects, posed an
unacceptably low chance of success, and a high risk that the treatment itself
would cause his death.” Id. at 1109–10, 1118.
119. Andrews, supra note 2, at 60.
120. See Harrell, supra note 38, at 847 (“Given such real life consequences
of a false positive and that the rate of false positives to true positives is as high
as 10 to 1 (or higher) for many of the newborn screens . . . .”).
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relational, and even physical harms from follow-up testing
and/or treatment.121 While the magnitude of such harms is
lower than failing to detect the condition, the probability of such
harms is likely much greater than the probability of identifying
the conditions screened for.
Despite these concerns and a general presumption against
compulsory genetic screening in virtually every other context,
mandatory NBS remains the norm, even when opportunities
arise to change the nature of this institution.122 As I argue in
Part III, it may be time to rethink the role of consent in NBS,
particularly with the potential of NBS to expand even further
and as NBS samples are used more widely in research, as the
next section shows. In addition, consent requirements may go
far in promoting the NBS education that parents, providers,
and scholars believe is woefully inadequate.123
B. STORAGE AND SECONDARY USES OF NBS SAMPLES
Once the newborn blood spots are analyzed for the various
NBS conditions, residual blood remains in the form of DBS.124
Increasingly, states retain these samples for future uses,
although the retention time varies significantly from state to
state. Some states have provisions to retain samples for only
one to four weeks, some for months, some for years, some for
decades, and others indefinitely.125 Often these samples are
stored with identifying information.126

121. See id. at 847–48.
122. MICH. COMM’N ON GENETIC PRIVACY & PROGRESS, FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 4, 33 (1999). This Author was a member of the Michigan
Commission on Genetic Privacy and Progress. Despite many months of
deliberation, a majority of the committee voted to retain mandatory NBS, with
an opt-out provision, although efforts were made to ensure that parents were
to receive information about NBS.
123. Sandra J. Carnahan, Biobanking Newborn Bloodspots for Genetic
Research Without Consent, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 299, 303, 322–25
(2011) (“Although educational pamphlets about the screening program are
typically
distributed
to
the
parent,
guardian,
or
managing
conservator . . . state statutes, almost universally, do not require NBS
programs to obtain the informed consent of the newborn’s parent prior to
extracting the blood sample.”).
124. Id. at 301.
125. See Michelle H. Lewis et al., State Laws Regarding the Retention and
Use of Residual Newborn Screening Samples, 127 PEDIATRICS 703, 704 (2011)
(“A total of 40% of state public health laboratories have reported retaining DBS
for at least 1 year.”); Richard S. Olney et al., Storage and Use of Residual Dried
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Although the samples are analyzed right away for NBS,
there are several reasons states might want to retain the
samples for months or even years. Many of these reasons are
related to the underlying purpose of NBS. For example, the
retention of these samples—along with contact information—is
necessary for follow-up and to ensure that there will be
appropriate intervention for an affected child.127 In addition,
labs may need to perform repeat tests to make a confirmatory
diagnosis or to reassure families if there is a false positive.128
Less directly related to NBS testing per se, but still connected
to the public health aspects of NBS, is the retention of blood
spots for quality assurance testing and to monitor the
prevalence of various conditions in the state.129 NBS samples
may also be helpful for post-mortem diagnosis; for example,
when trying to establish whether a genetic condition was
related to a child’s death.130
Increasingly, states are interested in long-term retention of
these blood spots for purposes not directly related to NBS. Some
states and/or other countries retain neonate blood spots for nonmedical or non-research uses, such as identification in
kidnappings or deaths.131 NBS samples have also been used for
paternity testing132 and could potentially be used for the
identification of criminals.133
Blood Spots from State Newborn Screening Programs, 148 J. PEDIATRICS 618,
619 fig. (2006).
126. Carnahan, supra note 123, at 320 (observing that a 2002 study found
that thirty-four out of thirty-six NBS program studies stored the DBS with
identifying information).
127. Id. at 304.
128. NBSTF, supra note 28, at 414.
129. Id. at 404, 413, 415–16 (suggesting that knowing about the prevalence
of various conditions is important not only for better understanding of the
condition, but also for determining the optimal allocation of resources).
130. Linda Kharaboyan et al., Storing Newborn Blood Spots: Modern
Controversies, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 741, 742 (2004).
131. MICH. COMM’N ON GENETIC PRIVACY & PROGRESS, supra note 122, at
28.
132. In New Zealand, the High Court ordered the Auckland Health Services
to provide the blood sample of a man’s child for paternity testing that he
sought after the baby died. H v G [M/1686/98] 1999, upheld in H v G (1999) 18
FRNZ 572 (HC).
133. Some have called for universal DNA databanking for criminal forensic
purposes. See, e.g., D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Databases for Law
Enforcement: The Coverage Question and the Case for a Population-Wide
Database, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF
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In addition, these blood spots, like most pathology samples,
are a treasure trove for researchers because they are a valuable
national repository of genetic material. As genetic technology
develops,134 the blood spots are an especially rich source of
research material: they are stable over time, they constitute an
unbiased collection of samples since they represent the entire
population,135 and they can potentially be linked to basic
demographic information.136 As one author notes, “[n]ewborn
screening initially began as a population health endeavor but is
rapidly becoming a resource for population research.”137
Newborn blood samples have been used in research and shared
with investigators since the 1980s,138 sometimes with
identifying information.139
Only recently have professional groups begun to consider
seriously how to handle the problems of storage and secondary
uses of the samples.140 Very few states have specific regulations
JUSTICE 247, 269–71 (David Lazer ed., 2004) (arguing that universal DNA
databases would eliminate the disproportionate minority representation in
forensic databases). NBS blood spots would offer an easy way to achieve this
goal.
134. “Optimal storage conditions” for these samples are less crucial for
genetic analysis than for other kinds of biochemical analysis. NBSTF, supra
note 28, at 415.
135. Nanette Elster, Future Uses of Residual Newborn Blood Spots: Legal
and Ethical Considerations, 45 JURIMETRICS 179, 180 (2005); Kharaboyan et
al., supra note 130, at 745.
136. NBSTF, supra note 28, at 415 (noting, however, that because these
bloodspots “will not be linked to clinical data on the children” their “potential
utility . . . will need to be carefully evaluated”).
137. Elster, supra note 135, at 189.
138. See Innocent Blood: Use of Newborn Heel Sticks Spurs Legal
Challenges, IRB ADVISOR (AHC Media, Atlanta, Ga.), Dec. 1, 2009 [hereinafter
Innocent Blood] (noting that many states used them to determine things like
the prevalence of HIV infections, prenatal exposure to heavy metals,
frequencies of certain genes); Michelle Lore, Is the Minnesota Department of
Health Violating Privacy Laws, MINN. LAW., Nov. 30, 2009 (stating that since
the end of 2008, 52,519 NBS samples from the state of Minnesota had been
used for research).
139. Elizabeth Cohen, The Government Has Your Baby’s DNA, CNN (Feb. 4,
2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/02/04/baby.dna.government/ (noting
that a study in Minnesota found that “more than 20 scientific papers have been
published in the United States since 2000 using newborn blood samples”).
140. NBSTF, supra note 28, at 389 (recommending that each state develop
and implement policies for retention of residual DBS, educate parents
regarding the storage and uses, and develop model consent forms and
information materials for parents); Brad Therrell et al., Briefing Paper:
Considerations and Recommendations for a National Policy Regarding the
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governing what kind of future uses the samples may be put to
or requiring that parents be notified of or give consent for such
uses.141 North Dakota, for example, does not require specific
consent, stores the samples indefinitely, and permits the use of
samples for “‘medical, psychological or sociological research.’”142
Indeed, because many parents do not realize that their child
has been screened for various diseases, they are unaware of the
possibility that a blood sample from their newborn may be
stored in state health departments for potentially long periods
of time and possibly shared with others for uses unrelated to
NBS.143
The laws in a few states are an exception to this rule. In
May of 2009, while the first Texas lawsuit challenging the
state’s practice of storing and using newborn samples for
undisclosed research was pending,144 the Texas Legislature
amended its NBS laws to require parents and guardians to be
informed that samples were being collected and would be stored
indefinitely for potential research purposes.145 Parents, or
children upon reaching adulthood, can now request to have the

Retention and Use of Dried Blood Spot Specimens After Newborn Screening,
RESOURCE REPOSITORY (Aug. 26, 2009), http://resourcerepository.org/
documents/1681/briefingpaper:considerationsandrecommendationsforanational
policyregardingtheretentionanduseofdriedbloodspotspecimensafternewborns/;
see APHL Position/Policy Statement: Residual Newborn Screening (NBS)
Specimens, APHL (2005), http://www.aphl.org/policy/Documents/residual_
newborn_screening_specimens.pdf (suggesting that retention of DBS is
important for laboratory quality assurance practices and can also be useful for
research among other things); see also AM. COLL. OF MED. GENETICS,
STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL GENETIC LABORATORIES (2008)
(finding it critical, if states do not retain DBS, for parents to have the option to
have their children’s DBS included in a national repository).
141. Lewis et al., supra note 125, at 703, 705, 707 (providing that “thirteen
states specify the purposes for which DBS may be used,” eight states require
parents to be notified of the retention of DBS, and three require “parents to be
informed” so that they can request destruction of the DBS). The United States
is not the only country where samples are also stored for long periods of time.
See Kharaboyan et al., supra note 130, at 742–43 (describing practices in
Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom).
142. Whelan, supra note 18, at 428.
143. See generally TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 33.0111–.0112
(West 2010) (showing the ability of a state to carry out such activities with
DBS).
144. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
145. See Higgins v. Tex. Dep’t of Health Servs., 801 F. Supp. 2d 541, 544–45
(W.D. Tex. 2011).
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samples destroyed within sixty days146—essentially an opt-outof-research approach. The lawsuit was settled once the State of
Texas agreed to destroy over five million coded newborn
samples,147 which had been stored indefinitely for possible
research without parental consent.148
Minnesota also has a limited opt-out provision, allowing
parents to refuse NBS itself or to request the destruction of test
results and samples following screening.149 Even so, the
Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in favor of parents who sued
the state for storing and authorizing public health research on
newborn samples on the grounds that these practices violated
Minnesota’s genetic privacy law.150 Although the court
construed the NBS statutes to be “an express exception to the
Genetic Privacy Act,” the storage, dissemination, and use of the
samples were not expressly authorized and therefore violated
the privacy statute.151 As a result of this decision, NBS samples
in Minnesota were not available for research or public health
studies. Recently, however, the Minnesota House of
Representatives and the Minnesota Senate passed bills that
would change this. If these bills become law, NBS samples
would be available for research, unless parents or the child,

146. Id. at 545.
147. Mary Ann Roser, Samples of Newborns’ Blood to Be Destroyed, AUSTIN
AM. STATESMAN, Dec. 23, 2009, at A1 (providing that the state decided that
trying to seek consent from all of those parents was a worse option than simply
destroying all of the samples). The samples were not identifiable, but because
they are coded, a link exists that could be used to identify the child. Id.
148. Cohen, supra note 139 (noting that in other states it may be very
difficult to convince the state to destroy your baby’s archived blood sample). A
class action filed late 2010 in Texas, also alleging that the state had stored
DBS for the purposes of undisclosed research, was dismissed as moot because
there was no evidence that the parties’ newborn samples were actually used or
distributed for research. Higgins, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 545, 554.
149. MINN. STAT. § 144.125 (2012); Lore, supra note 138 (explaining that
absent parents opting out, the NBS test results may become public health
data). In Minnesota, for example, the department of health has a contract with
the Mayo Clinic for analysis of NBS samples, which allows the Clinic to “keep
the samples indefinitely if there is no request for their destruction.” Id. The
samples are not identifiable, although they are coded, and therefore could
potentially be linked to the individual. Kharaboyan et al., supra note 130, at
744.
150. MINN. STAT. § 13.386 (2013); Bearder v. Minnesota, 806 N.W. 2d 766,
776 (Minn. 2011); Lore, supra note 138 (stating that Minnesota has been
storing the samples since 1997); Innocent Blood, supra note 138.
151. Bearder, 806 N.W. 2d at 776.
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over the age of eighteen, opt out, which they may do at any
time.152
Oklahoma and Michigan require more than the right to opt
out. The Oklahoma Legislature recently enacted a provision
that requires “express parental consent” for storage,
dissemination, and use of a newborn’s DNA.153 Michigan, after
seeking input from researchers, ethicists, community groups,
and the state health department’s institutional review board,
created a specific repository for future research that would
require affirmative, informed consent from parents.154 This
approach keeps the research uses of newborn samples separate
and distinct from NBS itself, which remains mandatory.155
As these lawsuits and this legislation suggest, many
secondary uses of DBS raise ethical and even legal concerns,
particularly when the uses are not related to the purposes for
which the samples were originally collected.156 Particularly
salient are the threats to privacy and confidentiality.157 In
addition, questions of autonomy and research ethics come into
play because the newborns potentially become research subjects
via their Guthrie cards.158 Contemporary practices with NBS
raise pressing questions as to whether consent must be secured
for storage and secondary uses of NBS samples, and if so what
kind of consent—general consent for research, or specific,
informed consent for a particular use.159

152. Minnesota House Passes Newborn Screening Bill, GENOME WEB
(May 2, 2014), http://www.genomeweb.com/clinical-genomics/minnesota-housepasses-newborn-screening-bill.
153. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1175 (West 2012).
154. Innocent Blood, supra note 138; see also Denise Chrysler et al., The
Michigan BioTrust for Health: Using Dried Bloodspots for Research to Benefit
the Community While Respecting the Individual, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 98,
98–99 (2011) (discussing the creation of Michigan’s Neonatal Biobank).
155. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5431 (West 2001).
156. Innocent Blood, supra note 138.
157. Id.
158. Id.; see also AGR, supra note 8, at 65 (discussing Guthrie cards).
159. These issues also tap into a longstanding debate about ownership and
control over one’s biological material, an issue on which we still have no clear
consensus. Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a
Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 803–11
(2004); see C. Thomas, The Use and Control of Heel Prick Blood Samples, 24
MED. & L. 259, 261–68 (2005) (applying various theories of property ownership
to NBS samples).
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An important consideration in evaluating the propriety of
the long-term storage and future uses of NBS samples is
whether the samples are identifiable; that is to say, whether
they can be linked directly to the newborn through identifying
information or indirectly through a code. NBS blood spots must,
of course, be identifiable initially so labs can locate and offer
follow-up testing to children with abnormal results. But
researchers try to anonymize previously identifiable samples by
unlinking them from their source.160 While some of the possible
future uses of newborn samples require the samples to be
identifiable—e.g., post-mortem identification, paternity testing,
forensics, and future diagnostics—many kinds of research
samples might potentially be anonymized, although as I note
below, people are increasingly skeptical about the effectiveness
of this practice.161
Current regulations require informed consent for research
on biospecimens that have already been archived and are
identifiable or linkable.162 The Federal Protections for Human
Research Subjects, sometimes called the “Common Rule,”163
require documented informed consent for participation in
research.164 Research on identifiable DBS easily falls within the
definition of human subject research under the regulations,
which includes analysis of “identifiable private information.”165
While state NBS programs have “not traditionally been viewed
as subject” to the Common Rule given that they are regulated
by state health departments,166 some scholars argue
convincingly that the federal regulations should apply to
research on DBS.167

160. NBSTF, supra note 28, at 416 (noting that they may have been
originally collected without identifiers or with identifiers that have been
removed).
161. Id. at 416–17; see infra text accompanying note 220.
162. Carnahan, supra note 123, at 315.
163. Id. Seventeen federal agencies have adopted these protections
“verbatim.” Id. at 315 n.102.
164. 45 C.F.R. § 46.117 (2013); see also Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
165. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2013) (defining human subject).
166. Carnahan, supra note 123, at 315–16.
167. Id. at 316–17 (arguing that federal dollars and policy guidance directly
and indirectly support NBS, including the collection, analysis, and storage of
“newborn bloodspots for future research purposes”); e.g., Therrell et al., supra
note 140, at 1, 3.
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Under the existing regulations, however, research on deidentified biological samples is generally understood to be
exempt from federal protections of human subjects research.168
Indeed, the Office of Human Research Protections does not
“consider research involving only coded private information or
specimens to involve human subjects . . . if . . . the private
information or specimens were not collected specifically for the
currently proposed research project . . . and the investigator(s)
cannot readily ascertain the identity to the individual(s) to
whom the coded private information or specimens pertain.”169
One scholar argues that this exemption does not apply to DBS
because they were collected not only as part of a screening
program, but also as part of a “research program.”170 While
sympathetic to the view that the exemption should not apply, I
am not persuaded that these samples would be treated
differently from any other biospecimens under the research
regulations because these samples were not collected with any
specific research protocol in mind.
The question of whether and how research should be
allowed on NBS or other biosamples reflects tensions between
public and private interests, and more specifically between
norms that focus on the value of research and norms that focus
on individual rights, autonomy, and privacy interests.171

168. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2013) (exempting from the research
regulations research “involving the collection or study of existing
data . . . pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens, if these sources are
publicly available or if the information is recorded by the investigator in such a
manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers
linked to the subjects”).
169. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., OHRP - Guidance on Research
Involving Coded Private Information or Biological Specimens (2008), available
at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/cdebiol.html. This interpretation clearly
seems to view research on biobanks with coded samples as not involving
human subjects research, even though “[t]he increase in genomic data, as well
as the increase of computerization of other records about individuals, will only
make identifying ‘anonymous’ biobank files easier and easier.” Henry T.
Greely, The Uneasy Ethical and Legal Underpinnings of Large-Scale Genomic
Biobanks, 8 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 343, 352–55 (2007).
170. Carnahan, supra note 123, at 320 (observing that “one purpose” of the
collection and storage of the DBS “is for future genetic research”).
171. Storage of Genetics Materials Comm., Am. Coll. of Med. Genetics,
ACMG Statement: Statement on Storage and Use of Genetic Materials, 57 AM.
J. HUM. GENETICS 1499 (1995). This issue creates tension between the ethical
principle of informed consent, which argues in favor of recontacting individuals
to obtain their consent, and the serious impracticabilities of doing so.
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Similar tensions about autonomy interests versus some
conception of the public good arise with respect to the question
of whether consent should be required for NBS itself.172 In
trying to determine how best to resolve these tensions, Part III
sets up a framework for balancing the conflicting interests and
applies this approach to the specific questions of whether some
form of consent should be required for: 1) the storage and
research uses of NBS samples; and 2) some or all aspects of
NBS itself.
III. BALANCING THE INTERESTS
In exploring the tensions between the public good and the
individual’s privacy and autonomy interests, we can see how
biases can influence the weight of the interests.173 As we shall
see below, those who strongly promote research and its benefits
to newborns and society tend to undervalue the privacy and
autonomy interests at stake. Similarly, the strong proponents of
privacy and autonomy tend to undervalue the public value of
the long-term retention and research use of DBS. As a result,
they reach an impasse, not only because they value things
differently, but also because their approaches differ.
Many proponents of expansive access to NBS samples and
other archived tissues “tend to rely on a narrow version of
consequentialism” to justify a broad range of research practices,
while minimizing the privacy and autonomy interests at
stake.174 The benefits of this approach seem “concrete and
tangible”175: preventing morbidity and mortality in newborns,
and gaining knowledge about various inherited disorders to
advance medicine and clinical care.176 The risks of broader
access to NBS samples—privacy intrusions and the loss of
autonomy interests—“are more amorphous concerns and are
therefore less viscerally compelling.”177 Indeed, many of the
public benefit proponents easily dismiss the value of autonomy

172. See Suter, supra note 50, at 246–50 (discussing value considerations in
prenatal testing).
173. Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and DNA Familial
Searching, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 309, 375–76 (2010) [hereinafter Suter, AITF]
(discussing a parallel trend with DNA familial searches).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Carnahan, supra note 123, at 300.
177. Suter, AITF, supra note 173, at 375.
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and privacy, and informed consent.178 This view argues for
expansive NBS with mandatory testing, long-term retention of
samples, and broad access to these samples by researchers
without consent.
In contrast, a position that privileges privacy and autonomy
would push toward requiring detailed informed consent for all
aspects of NBS: the collection of samples, the subsequent
analysis, the retention of samples, the manner in which they
are stored (coded, identifiable, or anonymized), access to the
samples, and uses to which the samples are put.179 This
approach would limit many of the potential research benefits
that have come from NBS programs and use of the samples.180
Clearly neither extreme fully considers all that is at stake.
As a result, I recommend an approach that “does not focus
exclusively on one or just a few values or desirable
consequences. Instead, it recognizes the competing goods at
stake.”181 Because I have described this approach in more detail
in an earlier piece, I will only briefly outline the methodology,
which borrows from philosopher W.D. Ross.182 The central
premise is that we have various underlying prima facie duties,
which may sometimes come into conflict.183 We have, for
example, prima facie duties to protect the public by supporting
and encouraging research and identifying children with
treatable conditions in a timely manner to minimize morbidity
and mortality. We also have prima facie duties to protect the
autonomy of the family and the future autonomy of the
newborns with respect to medical decision making and
participation in research, and duties to protect the privacy of
newborns. None of these duties is absolute in the sense that
they must always override conflicting duties.184 Instead, all of
these duties are “intrinsically binding”—they hold sway over us,
but “they are not always determinative of how we should act in

178. Id. at 376.
179. Carnahan, supra note 123, at 322–25.
180. Id. at 322 (noting that informed consent is problematic because future
research methods are unknowable).
181. Suter, AITF, supra note 173, at 376.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 376–77.
184. Id. at 377.
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any given instance . . . . Instead we can only determine what
our actual duty is in any circumstance by full reflection.”185
This approach does not attempt to declare winners and
losers when competing values come into play. Rather, it
attempts to reach a resolution that may ultimately tip more in
the direction of one duty than the other, but which continues to
recognize the pull of the competing values.186 That is to say,
when we determine what the actual duty is in any particular
circumstance, we should not abandon or forget about the
overridden prima facie obligations, because they continue to
“exert force on our subsequent attitudes and actions”187 and
leave “residual effects” or “moral traces.”188 If our full reflection
leads us to decide that certain research goals are particularly
important to society, we may decide to limit autonomy to some
extent to allow for that research. The pull of our duty to protect
individual autonomy, however, continues to compel us to
“approximate as closely as possible the values enshrined in the
overridden duty” so that we develop measures that least
infringe on parental autonomy.189
Considering whether consent should be required in NBS
forces us to make difficult choices between various competing
values and find ways to give weight, as much as possible, to the
overridden prima facie duties. In particular, we must apply this
balancing approach to decide: 1) what kind of consent
provisions, if any, we should use for NBS itself; and 2) whether

185. Id. I note in this piece that “this methodology does not offer conclusive
answers to most moral questions.” Id. at 378. It is, nevertheless, not arbitrary
or subjective. Rather, it requires a kind of “reflective equilibrium” where we
“check decisions from general principles against more intuitive judgments
about proper outcomes for particular cases.” Id. at 379. See generally JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 15–19, 40–47 (rev. ed. 1999) (describing the
“reflective equilibrium”).
186. Suter, AITF, supra note 173, at 378.
187. Id.
188. JAMES F. CHILDRESS, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CONFLICTS: ESSAYS
ON NONVIOLENCE, WAR, AND CONSCIENCE 69 (1982) (citing Robert Nozick,
Moral Complications and Moral Structures, 13 NAT. L.F. 1 (1968)); RICHARD B.
MILLER, CASUISTRY AND MODERN ETHICS: A POETICS OF PRACTICAL
REASONING 47 (1996); Suter, AITF, supra note 173, at 376 (“[O]verridden
values remain significant and continue to exert force and obligations on our
actions and deliberations. In other words, the overridden values do not go
away; they retain ‘moral traces.’”).
189. MILLER, supra note 188, at 47.
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consent should be required, and if so what kind, for the storage
and future uses of the samples.
I should emphasize that the issue of consent for NBS itself
and consent for storage and future uses need not be treated as a
package. Indeed, there are strong arguments for separating the
process of screening from the process of the creation of
biobanks, as I suggest below, and therefore completely
disaggregating the questions of consent. At the moment,
however, affirmative consent is generally removed from the
entire process. When we disaggregate the two sets of
decisions—whether to participate in NBS and whether to
participate in the biobank—it becomes clear that the conflicting
public/private values are very different. With respect to NBS
itself, at least when the conditions screened for develop in
infancy and are treatable or subject to amelioration, the conflict
is between the state’s interest in the well-being of the newborn
and the autonomy of the family. With respect to questions of
storage and, in particular, research uses of the samples, the
public value of research comes into conflict with the private
values of the families’ autonomy interests and the newborn’s
privacy and future autonomy interests. Because each set of
questions raises different tensions, I address each issue in turn.
I begin with the research question because it has received the
most attention recently and because it indirectly has
implications for the question of consent for NBS itself.
A. RETENTION AND RESEARCH USES OF DBS
In only a few other contexts does the government take one’s
tissue samples without consent and retain them for extended
periods of time: after conviction of certain crimes,190 and in the
military.191 In the first instance, the conviction results in the
loss of certain liberty interests.192 And in the case of the
military, one has a choice not to join the military. But in the
context of NBS, samples are usually taken without parental
consent and then stored for long periods, potentially to be used

190. Bonnie L. Taylor, Comment, Storing DNA Samples of Non-Convicted
Persons & the Debate over DNA Database Expansion, 20 T.M. COOLEY L. REV.
509, 512–14 (2003).
191. Megan Allyse et al., Ethics Watch: The G.I. Genome: Ethical
Implications of Genome Sequencing in the Military, 12 NATURE REVIEWS
GENETICS 589 (2011).
192. Taylor, supra note 190, at 514.
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for research, an approach that “veers from the norm.”193 As
noted, the justifications for doing so in the case of NBS are
rooted in a perspective that emphasizes the value of research
and that views archived samples as something akin to
community property.194 Some also argue that the public interest
and value of research are not just communal interests, but also
individual interests because everyone benefits from the
research.195
Even if we value research, however, we must recognize the
competing interests in autonomy and privacy in being able to
decide whether and to what extent to participate in research
and to control access to personal information. Privacy advocates
point out the dignitary interests, sometimes suggesting that
biosamples belong to the individual.196 Serious privacy concerns
arise when others have access to our genetic material, which
contains “a wealth of personal information such as
predisposition to certain diseases, behaviors, physical and
mental traits, parentage, and genetic relatedness to others.”197
The fact that the DBS contains genetic information and is likely
to be “readily identifiable” leads some to say that consent is

193. Cohen, supra note 139.
194. See David Korn, Genetic Privacy, Medical Information Privacy, and the
Use of Human Tissue Specimens in Research, in GENETIC TESTING AND THE
USE OF INFORMATION 16, 53 (Clarisa Long ed., 1999) (arguing that archived
human tissues are “a public resource dedicated to the public good, not, like a
savings bank, a depository of private property”); see also Rebecca Skloot,
Taking the Least of You, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, at M45 (“[P]eople are
morally obligated to allow their bits and pieces to be used to advance
knowledge to help others. Since everybody benefits, everybody can accept the
small risks of having their tissue scraps used in research.” (quoting David
Korn, supra)).
195. Korn, supra note 194, at 60; Karen Rothenberg, The Social
Implications of the Use of Stored Tissue Samples: Context, Control, and
Community, in GENETIC TESTING AND THE USE OF INFORMATION 84, 85–88
(Clarisa Long ed., 1999) (suggesting that both privacy and research are public
and private interests); see also Lisa Feuchtbaum et al., Questioning the Need
for Informed Consent: A Case Study of California’s Experience with a Pilot
Newborn Screening Research Project, 2 J. EMPIRICAL RES. ON HUM. RES.
ETHICS 3, 3 (2007) (“[T]he legitimate needs of society and the interests of
newborns should not be sacrificed to respond to the autonomy interests of the
few parents who did not wish their infant to participate in the study . . . .”).
196. Andrews, supra note 2, at 63.
197. Suter, AITF, supra note 173, at 331.
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required whether or not the samples are “linked or linkable.”198
Because this information is “fundamental and basic to our
makeup” and plays such “an important, though not monolithic,
role in influencing our ‘temperament, health, capacities, and
physical appearance,’”199 legislators at the state and federal
level have enacted various forms of genetic privacy protections
in the last few decades.200 I, like many others, have argued that
genetic information is “integral to the self,” and therefore is
among the kinds of personal information in which we have
strong privacy interests.201
Proponents of consent provisions for research on
biosamples are also motivated by a commitment to principles of
autonomy; the notion that individuals may not be treated as
merely a means to an end.202 Indeed, these ethical principles
have led not only to formal declarations about the various ways
in which researchers have an ethical obligation to protect
research subjects, but also to legal regulations protecting the
way in which research may and may not be conducted in the
United States.203 Among the most fundamental principles of
these ethical and legal norms are informed consent and the idea
that the researchers have a fiduciary obligation to protect
research subjects. A decision to become a participant in
research either to advance medicine or to benefit others and/or
oneself is a self-defining decision. It also creates a relationship
of trust because it involves sharing personal information with
researchers, imposing on them “special duties of care because of
the imbalance of power inherent in the relationship.”204
The degree to which we emphasize our duties to promote
research or to protect autonomy and privacy will determine our
198. Katherine Drabiak-Syed, Legal Regulation of Banking Newborn Blood
Spots for Research: How Bearder and Beleno Resolved the Question of Consent,
11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 13 (2011).
199. Suter, AITF, supra note 173, at 332.
200. See, e.g., Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA),
Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881; Genetic Privacy Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14287 (last updated
Jan. 2008) (describing the full range of state genetic privacy laws).
201. Suter, supra note 159, at 773. I have also noted that “genetic
information is not uniquely, nor is all genetic information equally, central to
the conception of the self.” Suter, AITF, supra note 173, at 334.
202. FURROW ET AL., supra note 107, at 405.
203. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.301–.306 (2013) (otherwise known as the “Common
Rule”).
204. Suter, supra note 159, at 787.
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approach to research on DBS. Under the extreme pro-research
position, samples should be available in any form for use by
researchers for any kind of investigation. Such an approach
would seriously undermine the privacy interests of the child
and autonomy interests of the family. It would allow the use of
the newborn samples in identifiable form, which would privilege
research over privacy and autonomy. Not surprisingly, this
approach is inconsistent with the well-established consensus
that under the Common Rule, identifiable samples cannot be
used for research without one’s informed consent.205 The
Common Rule recognizes that the value of research, while real,
is not absolute and therefore cannot override autonomy at all
costs.206
At the other, pro-privacy/autonomy extreme, any future use
of the samples for research would require detailed informed
consent whether the samples were identifiable, coded, or
anonymized, regardless of the uses. This approach would
privilege privacy and autonomy interests over the value to the
public of various research studies, potentially hindering
research. It would be extremely difficult (if not impossible) and
expensive to implement since it would require researchers to
locate families to seek their consent for virtually every future
study. Moreover, meaningful informed consent is often
impossible to obtain when biospecimens, whether DBS or other
forms, are initially collected because the parents or sources of
the samples cannot be informed of all possible research uses
and outcomes. In some ways, it might even be counterproductive to privacy interests since it would require the
samples to remain identifiable while in long-term storage for
the purpose of contacting the families.
The current system and recommended approach of some
scholars and professional groups might be considered a
compromise of sorts; informed consent is required if the samples
are identifiable, but otherwise consent is not required for

205. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101(b)(4), 46.111(a)(4) (2013).
206. There are many methodologically sound and highly valuable types of
research that we do not allow because values like privacy, autonomy, and the
mental and physical well-being of individuals would make such studies
unethical. The unfortunate history of human subject research in Nazi Germany
and even in this country has taught us important lessons about the limits to
which we can endanger others and limit their autonomy simply to further
science. FURROW ET AL., supra note 107, at 405–13.
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anonymized or de-identified samples.207 The theory, in brief, is
that the privacy risks are substantially minimized once
identifiers are removed. To the extent that no samples are ever
truly anonymized, however, this argument becomes less
persuasive. In addition, as some have pointed out, even under
this system, sometimes researchers actually use biospecimens
with identifiers, rather than in anonymized form, without
obtaining consent or Institutional Review Board (IRB)
approval.208
Regardless of whether we consider the current system
appropriate for biobanks in general, we must recognize that
NBS biobanks are unique in implicating particularly salient
privacy and autonomy interests. First, parents often have not
given consent to (or are even aware of) the collection of the
biospecimen and NBS in the first place, let alone the long-term
storage and potential research on the specimens. Indeed, one
study showed that only twelve states mention specimen storage
in the informational pamphlet that parents receive for NBS.209
With other biobanks, it is likely that the source of the specimen
consented to (and knew about) the removal of the sample from
his or her body (whether or not consent was given for later uses
of the sample).
Second, these samples are obtained from minors and
therefore any research on these samples is research on children,
who are treated under the Common Rule as a vulnerable class
deserving of heightened protection.210 While minors can
participate in research, there are very limited instances in

207. Amy L. McGuire & Laura M. Beskow, Informed Consent in Genomics
and Genetic Research, 11 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS 361, 370
(2010).
208. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 198, at 43. When the plaintiff in the Bearder
litigation requested documentation from the Minnesota Department of Health
(MDH) regarding its process of de-identification of samples for research, the
MDH stated that it had no such documents, suggesting that “there is no
established de-identification procedure and that the process and standards
vary from project to project and are subject to subjective standards.” Whelan,
supra note 18, at 441 (internal quotation marks omitted).
209. SEC’YS ADVISORY COMM. ON HERITABLE DISORDERS IN NEWBORNS &
CHILDREN, CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NATIONAL
GUIDANCE REGARDING THE RETENTION AND USE OF RESIDUAL DRIED BLOOD
SPOT SPECIMENS AFTER NEWBORN SCREENING 16 (2009) [hereinafter
ACHDNC] (citing personal communication with Aaron Goldenberg).
210. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401–.409 (2013) (describing “Additional Protections
for Children Involved as Research Subjects”).
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which consent for participation is not required. For example,
even the least problematic category of research on children—
“[r]esearch not involving greater than minimal risk”—still
requires the child’s assent and parental consent,211 unless the
general waiver provisions for informed consent apply.212
Scholars have debated whether the waiver provisions should
apply in this context.213 The crux of the matter turns on
whether informed consent is practicable or not. As one scholar
notes, even when researchers do not have to obtain informed
consent under the regulations, they often do, demonstrating
that it is not always impracticable.214 When children are
involved and their biospecimens are retained for long periods of
time, there is a strong argument that they should have the right
(upon reaching the age of majority) to decide for themselves
whether they want to be research participants.215
Third, as I shall argue in more detail below, the state, as
protector of the newborn and as mandator of the collection of
the DBS, has a fiduciary obligation to protect the autonomy and
privacy interests of the newborn with respect to the collection,
retention, and use of the samples. For all of these reasons,
whatever concerns we may have about the use of biobanks
without consent (informed or general) are further heightened in
this context.

211. 45 C.F.R. § 46.404.
212. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d) (2013) (waiving informed consent requirements
when the research “involves no more than minimal risk to the subjects . . . [t]he
waiver or alteration will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of the
subjects . . . [t]he research could not practicably be carried out without the
waiver or alteration,” and when appropriate, “the subjects will be provided
with additional pertinent information after participation”).
213. Compare ACHDNC, supra note 209, at 19 (“A balanced consideration
of concerns justifies waiving informed consent for population-based newborn
screening research using de-identified specimens when a clinically well-defined
test and an effective therapy are present.”), with Carnahan, supra note 123, at
320–21 (challenging the notion that informed consent would be “impracticable”
because “a physician-patient relationship already exists between the physician
and the mother-to-be, and it is typically the physician that is responsible for
obtaining the bloodspot for screening and research”), and Drabiak-Syed, supra
note 198, at 38 (suggesting that waiver has “been used as a creative
mechanism to overcome administrative barriers”).
214. Ellen Wright Clayton, Patients and Biobanks, 51 VILL. L. REV. 793,
796–97 (2006).
215. David Gurwitz et al., Children and Population Biobanks, 325 SCI. 818,
818 (2009).

2014]

CONSENT IN NEWBORN SCREENING

771

As a result, we should not weigh the interest in favor of
research as strongly in this context as we might with respect to
other types of biobanks. Indeed, this strongly supports the view
that we should prohibit the use of DBS for any research.216
While this would certainly limit the privacy and autonomy risks
for the newborn and his or her family, to the extent that this
population offers unique possibilities for research, one might
argue that such a proposal goes too far. It is undoubtedly true
that much of the research done on DBS need not be done on
that particular population. But some forms of research may
benefit substantially by collecting data from a pool, like the
NBS samples, which represents the population so well. In
addition, to the extent that any clinical data are combined with
research on the DBS, research from birth through later life
might offer unique insights into various disease processes that
would be harder to obtain with other populations. Given that
research of these samples poses heightened concerns, however,
if any research on DBS should be allowed, it should be limited
to research that benefits the pediatric population. Michigan’s
approach, for example, recognizes the importance of using
newborn samples only for research that is relevant to the
pediatric community.217
To the extent that any research goes forward on DBS, for
all of the reasons described above, it is appropriate to give
families (and the child upon reaching the age of majority) some
control over whether the DBS are archived for research
purposes. Consistent with current requirements for research on
biospecimens, informed consent should be obtained for research
on identifiable NBS samples generally (except in the rare
instances where a waiver could apply).
Under the current interpretations of the Common Rule,
however, affirmative consent would not be required for deidentified samples,218 which is problematic in the NBS context.
As biobanks generally become more prevalent and central to
genomics research, scholars have debated whether this
approach is ethically justifiable, not just with respect to NBS,
but for all biobanks. Scholars have argued that “a person has an
216. Hank Greely has argued that there is simply no reason for researchers
to utilize DBS when there are other biorepositories to use. Author’s personal
communication.
217. Chrysler et al., supra note 154, at 99.
218. McGuire & Beskow, supra note 207, at 370.
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interest in consenting or not consenting to be part of research,”
even if it includes analysis of biospecimens.219 Growing concerns
about the inability to truly anonymize biological samples220
have led to further calls to rethink the current approach toward
research on biospecimens.221 Indeed, in response to advances “in
genetic and information technologies that make complete deidentification of biospecimens impossible,” the Department of
Health and Human Services proposed changes to the consent
requirements for research on biospecimens.222 Specifically, the
proposed changes would eliminate the ability to do research on
de-identified biological samples without consent. Instead, it
would require “written general consent” for research use of
archival biospecimens, whether or not researchers ultimately
decide to use identifiers.223 The intended general written
consent would allow individuals “to say no to all future
research,” and give them the option to say yes or no to “a
handful of special categories of research with biospecimens”
that might raise “unique concerns . . . for a significant segment
of the public.”224 In addition, the proposed changes would allow
219. See, e.g., Greely, supra note 169, at 356.
220. See, e.g., id. at 351–52; Melissa Gymrek et al., Identifying Personal
Genomes by Surname Inference, 339 SCI. 321, 321 (2013); Nils Homer et al.,
Resolving Individuals Contributing Trace Amounts of DNA to Highly Complex
Mixtures Using High-Density SNP Genotyping Microarrays, 4 PUB. LIBR. SCI.
GENETICS, Aug. 29, 2008, at 1–2; Zhen Lin et al., Genomic Research and
Human Subject Privacy, 305 SCI. 183, 183 (2004); Amy L. McGuire & Richard
A. Gibbs, No Longer De-Identified, 312 SCI. 370, 370–71 (2006); Laura L.
Rodriguez et al., The Complexities of Genomic Identifiability, 339 SCI. 275,
275–76 (2013).
221. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Harnessing the Benefits of Biobanks, 33 J.L.
MED & ETHICS 22, 24 (2005); Carnahan, supra note 123, at 320.
222. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44,525 (proposed July 26, 2011) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 46, 160, 164). These were part of a broader proposed
overhaul of the “Common Rule.” Id. at 44,514.
223. Id. at 44,519 (emphasis added). The proposed regulations would move
away from the concept of “exempt research” and create a new category of
“excused research” that is intended both to “increase protections”—by
requiring general consent as opposed to no consent for all biospecimens (as well
as for pre-existing data collected for research, whether or not the researcher
uses identifiers, and for pre-existing data that were collected for purposes other
than research, if the researcher uses identifiers)—“and broaden the types of
studies covered,” by allowing researchers to use identified biospecimens as long
as they had general consent. Id. at 44,518–19.
224. Id. at 44,519–20 (giving as examples the creation of cell lines or
reproductive research).
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for waivers in some (unspecified) instances.225 Although these
proposed regulations have not been adopted so far, they reflect
an attempt to balance the pressures to promote research and
protect individual privacy and autonomy.226
Following a modified version of the proposed amendments
to the regulations for human subjects research, states should
ask for general consent for the storage of DBS for future
research uses of de-identified DBS.227 Parents would be entitled
to say no to all future research, yes to all future research, or no
to a handful of specific categories of research that might be
problematic.228 In addition, children, upon reaching the age of
majority, should be able to refuse consent for research or for
particular categories of research.229
The focus on general, as opposed to detailed informed,
consent serves two functions. It attempts to give parents (and
the future adult the newborn will become) some autonomy
protections while recognizing the value of research.230 It
concedes the pro-research view that fully informed consent in
this context truly is problematic; at the time the samples are
collected, there may not be any specific plans for research, let
alone for specific research protocols.231 Thus, it is simply
impossible to inform parents about the details of possible future
research. In addition, the circumstances in which the samples
are collected—during the newborn period—do not easily lend
themselves to the lengthy discussions that informed consent

225. The advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM), however, notes
that the waivers “would not necessarily be the same as those for other types of
research.” Id. at 44,520.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 44,519. I call this a modified version because the ANPRM would
require general consent for both the use of identified and identifiable samples.
In my view, as long as informed consent is required for identifiable samples in
other contexts, there is no argument for affording NBS biobanks less protection
than other biobanks. Moreover, the rationale for using samples in this form
would likely be to follow clinical outcomes, which itself would require
considerable efforts to contact families or physicians to obtain clinical
information.
228. Id. at 44,518–20.
229. Id. at 44,524.
230. Feuchtbaum et al., supra note 195, at 8–9 (discussing parental
autonomy protections).
231. Elster, supra note 135, at 187–88.
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would require, even if the specific future research protocols
were known.232
Of course, if we were to separate the NBS process from the
collection of samples for research, then this removes many of
the challenges of obtaining consent during the newborn period.
Such an approach might be justified by the concerns that the
research is not in any one newborn’s best interest, but instead
serves the public good.233 As a result, we should eliminate any
pressure to consent to research that might occur during the
newborn period, especially if parents do not fully understand
that the question of screening is not conceptually or practically
linked to whether or not research is done.
But disaggregating consent for screening from consent for
research does not eliminate the general problem of obtaining
fully informed consent for research on pathology samples, given
the impossibility of knowing about all future research
endeavors in advance. Moreover, such disaggregation
potentially removes one of the benefits of collecting DBS during
the newborn period—the potential of collecting samples that
represent the population. The challenges of tracking down
families after that period would undoubtedly diminish the yield
of samples available for research, potentially even more than
the process of trying to obtain more complete informed consent.
A lesser, but real, concern is that families that wanted to
support such research but were not tracked down would lose out
on the chance to consent to research. Of course, seeking consent
for retention of samples for research in the prenatal period
might lessen these concerns, although this would not be helpful
in cases where women do not receive prenatal care.234 Thus,
while some powerful reasons argue for separating consent for
research from consent for NBS, we should recognize that such
an approach is not without costs.
At whatever stage the consent process occurs for research
on DBS, I am advocating what is essentially an opt-in approach
for future research. Undoubtedly, even this approach would be
less favorable to the research community than being able to
access de-identified samples without any consent requirement,
232. Id.
233. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 198, at 36–38 (focusing on the benefit of the
majority).
234. Whelan, supra note 18, at 452 (noting that not all women receive
prenatal care).
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because surely the latter approach would maximize the number
of available samples. As a second choice, they would likely
prefer opt-out to opt-in provisions under the theory that they
are likely to have a larger pool of samples if parents must act
affirmatively to prevent the storage of the samples, as opposed
to requiring parents’ affirmative consent for storage and future
research.235 One consideration in choosing opt-in versus opt-out
approaches is what the legislative default goals are. If the
incentives are to promote research, the “nudging” of an opt-out
approach may be viewed as making it more likely that such
samples are available.236 But given the many concerns
surrounding research on DBS, it is hard to argue we should be
trying to “nudge” families into participating in research.
In fact, the data so far suggest that it is debatable how
great the risk is that people would decline participation in
research. Several studies suggest that a large percentage of
parents would consent to participate in research.237 A 2008
study, for example, found that 90% of mothers would agree to
participate in an NBS biobank with no restrictions on the type
of research performed.238 Another study found that 76.2% of
parents were “very or somewhat willing” to permit storage of
and research on DBS, whereas if consent were not obtained,
only 28.2% would be “very or somewhat willing” to allow the use
of DBS for research.239 On the other hand, Texas’s limited
experience with opt-out provisions suggests that it had some,
though not a significant, effect on the size of the newborn pool.
In a roughly six-month period, 240,000 samples were collected

235. Innocent Blood, supra note 138 (explaining how any samples moving
forward require consent as part of the opt-in program).
236. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 83–86 (2008) (noting the
importance of the default position for opt-out v. opt-in rules).
237. E.g., Feuchtbaum et al., supra note 195, at 7–8; Alon B. Neidich et al.,
Empirical Data About Women’s Attitudes Towards a Hypothetical Pediatric
Biobank, 146A AM. J. MED. GENETICS 297, 299 (2008); B.A. Tarini et al., Not
Without My Permission: Parents’ Willingness to Permit Use of Newborn
Screening Samples for Research, 13 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 125, 130 (2010).
238. Neidich et al., supra note 237, at 302; see also Feuchtbaum et al., supra
note 195, at 7 (stating that although not all parents were asked to participate
in a study of NBS because of the burdens on the hospital, ninety percent of
those asked consented to enroll their NBS in the study to research NBS testing
methods and to identify additional genetic diseases).
239. Tarini et al., supra note 237, at 128–29 (finding that women had
misperceptions about what participation in a biobank would entail).

776

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 15:2

and the state received 6900 requests to destroy samples—a rate
of 2.8%.240 We do not know how these numbers would compare
with an opt-in provision or what parents understood about
storage and possible future uses when they opted out.
In addition, there are potentially legitimate concerns about
the possibility of consent bias when parents opt in. Many argue
that giving people the opportunity to say no would not only
reduce the pool of biospecimens available for research because
of “uninformed denial,”241 but would also lead to consent bias in
the biospecimens that are available.242 Given that the pool of
newborns is so vast, there may be reason to think that the
effects of consent bias might be lessened, albeit not completely
eliminated, by the sheer number of samples potentially
available.
Even if evidence shows that the pool of research samples
might be smaller with an opt-in provision or that there is a
greater risk of consent bias, this alone is not a reason to reject
these measures to protect autonomy.243 The entire justification
for removing consent requirements from NBS generally is the
notion that the screening program is intended to benefit
newborns.244 Removing consent for participation in future
research on DBS cannot be justified on the same grounds.245
The extent to which the research benefits newborns may vary,
but even research that is primarily geared toward benefiting
newborns will provide much more indirect benefits than the
actual screening for treatable and serious conditions.246
Research that does not focus on the newborn or pediatric
population offers even less benefit to newborns and cannot at all
justify the lack of consent.247 Thus, as noted earlier, any

240. Roser, supra note 147, at A1.
241. Korn, supra note 194, at 48.
242. E.g., Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado About Data Ownership, 25 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 69, 95–98 (2011); Kharaboyan et al., supra note 130, at 747.
243. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 198, at 36 (noting that the “benefit to the
majority is not alone a sufficient interest to override individual autonomy”);
Whelan, supra note 18, at 453 (“As a society, we cannot allow administrative
costs or burdens to justify infringements on individual rights, parental rights,
and genetic privacy.”).
244. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 198, at 36.
245. Innocent Blood, supra note 138.
246. Feuchtbaum et al., supra note 195, at 7–9.
247. Id. at 11–12.
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research on DBS should ideally be limited to that which
benefits the pediatric population.
One additional concern with the opt-in approach is that
requiring affirmative consent for retention and research uses of
DBS will lead some parents to opt out of NBS altogether in
jurisdictions where that is possible.248 Here, the value of
providing parental autonomy and the child’s future autonomy is
set against the potential harms to newborns if severe and
treatable conditions are not identified in the newborn period.249
This concern might, therefore, argue for decoupling consent for
NBS from the consent for research uses of DBS.
There is a strong argument to be made the other way,
however. Whether or not the consent process for NBS and
research are disaggregated, seeking parental consent for future
research on the DBS helps establish the public’s trust in the
NBS process generally.250 Recent attention to long-term storage
and research uses of these samples may lead parents to think of
NBS, not so much as a program intended to protect the health
of newborns, but as an effort to create a universal research
pool.251 This may create push back with respect to NBS
altogether, causing parents to opt out of NBS to resist what
they perceive as the heavy hand of government.252 As Dr.
Jeffery Botkin suggests, denying parents the chance to opt out
of future research may undermine the public’s trust in the
entire endeavor.253 Indeed, it is precisely such suspicion and
loss of trust that led to the lawsuits in Texas and Minnesota.254
As one parent in the Texas lawsuit explained, “To me, this
whole thing is about consent . . . . If they had asked me I
probably would have consented. The fact that it was a secret
program really made me so suspicious of the true motives,
there’s no way I would consent now.”255 Thus, as long as any
research is done on the DBS, whether consent is obtained in the
future or during the newborn period, the public needs to know

248. Id. at 11.
249. Id. at 8–9.
250. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 184, at 12–13, 23, 42.
251. Id. at 23, 35–36.
252. Id. at 35–36.
253. Innocent Blood, supra note 138 (quoting Jeffrey R. Boktin).
254. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 198, at 25–34.
255. Roser, supra note 147, at A1; see also Whelan, supra note 18, at 442
(“As one parent succinctly stated: ‘I want to have the choice.’”).
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that any use of these samples requires affirmative consent from
parents. The state should not presume consent.
Not only is the public’s trust important to the sustainability
of the NBS project as a whole, but trust is also inherent in the
relationship the state creates between itself and the child in
setting up NBS. The most persuasive justification for NBS is
the parens patriae notion that the state steps in to act as parent
for the child.256 This creates a trust-based, fiduciary
relationship (which goes beyond the ordinary fiduciary
obligation the state owes its citizens) given that the state takes
over some aspects of the child’s care for the well-being of the
child.257 As a consequence, a strong obligation exists not only to
ensure that NBS maximizes the well-being of the child, but to
ensure that any ancillary uses of the samples do not in any way
undermine the best interests of the child, even for the benefit of
society as a whole.
Michigan’s creation of the BioTrust for Health, which is
intended to facilitate and promote research on the DBS of NBS,
was modeled on the concept of a charitable trust.258 Under this
model, the source of the specimen (in this case the parent acting
on behalf of the child) “formally expresses” the desire to transfer
the specimen into the control of the trustee (the state) who will
keep the sample for the benefit of the beneficiary (the general
public).259 Important to this approach is the notion that the
transfer is intentional and freely given, and that the recipient of
biospecimens (in this case the state) “has a responsibility to
serve as a trustee, or steward, of the tissue to ensure protection
of the contribution.”260 This model suggests three things: first,
that parents should consent to the use of their newborn’s
samples for inclusion in the research biobank; second, that the
samples are to be used for the benefit of the public; and third,
and most important, that the recipient has a fiduciary
obligation not only to develop clear rules about the kinds of uses
to which these samples can be put, but also to implement
security measures to protect the confidentiality of the

256. AGR, supra note 8, at 261.
257. Id.
258. Chrysler et al., supra note 154, at 98 (citing David J. Winickoff &
Richard Winickoff, The Charitable Trust as a Model for Genomic Biobanks, 349
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1180, 1180 (2003)).
259. Winickoff & Winickoff, supra note 258, at 1182–83.
260. Id. at 1182.
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information in the samples.261 Given the limits of deidentification and anonymization in protecting privacy,262 it is
particularly important that the state develop explicit guidelines
as to the legitimate uses of the samples both in terms of the
best interests of the newborns and the public and in terms of
security measures.
Indeed, the charitable trust model does not require that the
state hold the DBS. Instead, a non-state charitable trust could
be created and charged with the obligation of holding the
samples and ensuring that their use is for the benefit of the
public. The fact that the state would not possess the DBS and
that this approach would disentangle the NBS process from the
research aspects would likely help promote public trust.
While there are legitimate concerns about the
impracticabilities of obtaining informed consent about future
research uses, efforts should be made to inform parents about
the general nature of the permissible and impermissible uses of
the samples as well as security provisions. Such efforts would
not only protect the autonomy interests of the family, but might
also indirectly promote research. If families believe that the
government has given careful attention to the kinds of uses that
it will and will not allow, and has been attentive to the security
of this personal information, families may be more inclined to
participate. Otherwise, the public may not trust the state,
believing, at best, that it has been negligent in protecting
against problematic uses of the samples or, at worst, that the
state may have malignant plans for such samples, which is why
it has not set limits on these future uses.
B. CONSENT FOR NBS ITSELF
A conclusion that parental consent should be required for
storage and research use of a newborn’s DBS does not
necessarily mean that consent should also be required for NBS
itself. In fact, Michigan, whose BioTrust approach for research
on DBS is commendable, requires written consent for the
inclusion of the samples in the biobank (and the right of a child
upon age of majority to have their DBS removed), but it does

261. See id. at 1182–83 (describing the charitable trust model generally and
emphasizing the factors asserted in the text).
262. Greely, supra note 169, at 352–55.
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not require consent for the screening.263 Moreover, the balance
of public and private interests argues less strongly for
affirmative consent with respect to NBS than in the research
context since achieving high rates of NBS not only benefits the
newborn, but also parents and society as a whole.264 Even
though I concede that the case for consent is less strong in this
context, the recent and likely future expansions in NBS make
an increasingly compelling case for rethinking parental consent
in this context as well.265
To be sure, there are serious challenges in requiring true
informed consent for the screening itself. Given the number of
diseases screened for, obtaining meaningful informed consent of
the sort that the law demands for a physically invasive and
risky medical procedure would be virtually impossible for each
and every condition in the NBS panel.266 The likely expansion of
the panel of diseases and possibility of whole genome
sequencing in the future only enhances this problem. Whatever
challenges conveying this wealth of information presents in
ordinary circumstances are magnified by the fact that the
disclosures typically occur during the newborn period, when
parents are unlikely to be able to process the details of the
nature of each of these conditions, the various treatment
options for affected children, and the likelihood each of the
conditions will manifest symptoms.267 Additional concerns
surrounding informed consent are the economic and logistical

263. Chrysler et al., supra note 154, at 100.
264. Feuchtbaum et al., supra note 195, at 8–12.
265. Even if consent should occur for NBS, however, it does not follow that
it should occur at the same time as consent for research. Indeed, as noted
above, there are some powerful reasons to separate out the two consent
processes.
266. This is a problem generally with any kind of multiplex testing. See,
e.g., Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass’n, Multiplex Genetic
Testing, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July–Aug. 1998, at 15, 15–18 (explaining
multiplex genetic testing and informed consent within this context); Robert J.
Wells, Correspondence, Generic Consent for Genetic Screening, 331 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1024, 1024 (1994) (“Burdening us all with a system of ‘enforceable’
standards . . . will keep us ignorant by delaying the gathering of information
needed to make these kinds of determinations.”); see also Greely, supra note
169, at 352–55, 357–59 (discussing the hurdles in obtaining informed consent
for genetic research and testing).
267. AGR, supra note 8, at 6 (explaining the disclosure methods during the
newborn period).
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burdens such a requirement would place on health care
providers and the public health system.268
How logistically challenging it is to obtain consent for NBS,
however, is debatable. One much cited pilot study for a new
NBS technology confirms some of these worries. The research
study, which required informed consent, found that obtaining
written informed consent was a “serious logistical burden” for
the hospitals involved.269 As a result, the researchers only
achieved forty-seven percent participation in the study.270 On
the other hand, a study in Germany suggested that much
higher participation rates could be achieved when written
consent was sought.271 In that case, almost ninety-nine percent
of the parents consented to NBS.272 Similarly, an older study of
Maryland’s previous informed consent approach to NBS found
“no evidence that the parental consent regulation had a
negative effect on the public’s health. . . . [or] that the [NBS]
program had become less cost-effective.”273 The data seems
mixed as to the burden that seeking informed or written
consent imposes.
To say, however, that obtaining true informed consent is
impossible, results in unacceptably low yields of parental
consent, or is effective but unduly expensive, does not mean we
should abandon all efforts to seek any form of parental
consent.274 An approach that requires affirmative parental
consent—i.e., an opt-in approach—would offer the next best
form of respecting parental autonomy. Most states, however,
have chosen the opt-out approach, which theoretically still
offers some parental control because it creates the right for
parents who greatly oppose NBS to decline screening of their

268. Id. at 156–57.
269. Feuchtbaum et al., supra note 195, at 6.
270. See id. at 7 (stating that only forty-seven percent of newborns
participated in the MS/MS screening during the pilot study’s time frame).
271. Bernhard Liebl et al., Very High Compliance in an Expanded MS–MSBased Newborn Screening Program Despite Written Parental Consent, 34
PREVENTIVE MED. 127, 127 (2002).
272. Id. at 127, 130–31.
273. Faden et al., supra note 80, at 1351.
274. See Ainsley Newson, Should Parental Refusals of Newborn Screening
Be Respected?, 15 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 135, 140, 144 (2006)
(“Although parental autonomy is not, of course, legally or morally limitless,
parents should (and do) enjoy a degree of freedom from state interference in
private and family life.”).
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newborn.275 In order for an opt-out option to offer any true
semblance of respecting parental autonomy, however, parents
must understand that they have an option to opt out, which
requires some awareness and general understanding of the
NBS process and the option to opt out.276 Unfortunately, that
rarely happens.277 This may be because providers fail to inform
parents, because so much is happening during the newborn
period that parents cannot absorb or process whatever
information they might get, or some combination of the two. As
a result, there is a strong case for NBS education to occur in the
prenatal period when there is more time for reflection,
discussion, and comprehension.278 Although, again, this is only
helpful for women who receive prenatal care.
Even if education regarding NBS were enhanced by
requiring NBS education during the prenatal period, there is
reason to think that an opt-out approach would still be less
than optimal if the goal is parental education. The incentives
simply are too few to educate parents under an opt-out as
compared to an opt-in approach. Under an opt-out approach, the
default is to test, which creates no incentive to discuss NBS
with parents.279 Testing will occur with or without such a
discussion. A statutory requirement to discuss NBS might not
be a sufficient incentive to educate the families in light of the
many other demands on health care providers’ time. In
contrast, under an opt-in approach, the default is not to test
unless parents consent, which creates strong incentives to
discuss NBS with parents, even if only in general terms.280
An additional argument in favor of the opt-in approach,
given the goal of parental education, is that it is more cost-

275. Feuchtbaum et al., supra note 195, at 9.
276. Moody & Choudhry, supra note 9, at 246–48.
277. See id. at 240, 244 (noting that parents “are not even aware that they
have a clear choice to make” in the United Kingdom’s opt-out program, and
finding in their own study that 41.7% of respondents “did not feel able to
decline,” while many thought NBS was “compulsory”).
278. See, e.g., MICH. DEP’T OF CMTY. HEALTH, NEWBORN SCREENING GUIDE
FOR HOSPITALS 19 (2014) (“Education is ideally done during the prenatal
period.”).
279. Faden et al., supra note 80, at 1350 (discussing how mothers believe a
routine default procedure does not require consent or discussion).
280. Id. at 1351 (describing the procedure in Maryland, which would appear
to be similar to the current suggestion).
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effective than full-blown informed consent would be.281 The
study of Maryland’s program established, albeit many years
ago, that parents can be educated adequately about newborn
screening generally—not with respect to the details of every
condition—in no more than five minutes.282 Further, there are
cost-effective methods, such as decision aids, which are being
developed for a range of medical decisions,283 to provide parents
with an overview of NBS. Indeed, some have advocated a
system that would provide basic information about NBS to
parents with options for access to more detailed information
should they want it.284 Such an approach would further promote
autonomy by allowing people to decide how much information to
receive.
Were there evidence to suggest that an opt-in approach
would lead to a great deal of uninformed denial, this might be a
powerful reason to forgo some protections of parental autonomy
to prevent (the admittedly small number of) newborns from
suffering from debilitating or life-threatening illnesses. But
evidence suggests, as we shall see, that involving parents in the
decision-making process may actually enhance the effectiveness
of NBS, and therefore opt-in provisions may further both
goals—protecting the health of the newborn population and
promoting parental autonomy.285
A study conducted over two decades ago showed that the
refusal rate for NBS is really quite low in the states where NBS
is truly voluntary.286 It found that Maryland and New
Hampshire, out of twelve states studied, had the highest
percentage of NBS: ninety-eight percent of their newborns.287

281. See id. (“There was also no evidence that the program had become less
cost-effective because of increased costs to the health care system.”).
282. See id. at 1350 (“Most nurses . . . responded that obtaining consent or
refusal took from one to five minutes.”).
283. See, e.g., Elie A. Akl et al., A Decision Aid for COPD Patients
Considering Inhaled Steroid Therapy: Development and Before and After Pilot
Testing, BMC MED. INFORMATICS & DECISION MAKING, May 15, 2007, at 1, 4–6
(discussing the use of decision aids for COPD).
284. Harrell, supra note 38, at 849–50.
285. Jean-Louis Dhondt, Implementation of Informed Consent for a Cystic
Fibrosis Newborn Screening Program in France: Low Refusal Rates for
Optional Testing, 147 J. PEDIATRICS S106, S107–08 (Supp. Sept. 2005); Liebl et
al., supra note 271, at 130–31.
286. Andrews, supra note 2, at 60.
287. Id.
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Maryland had a program that required informed consent288 (it
now has an opt-out approach289), and New Hampshire allows
parents to refuse NBS for any reason.290 In contrast, the other
ten states, all with mandatory screening programs that allow
parental refusal only for religious reasons, screened fewer
newborns. One state managed to screen a mere fifty-eight
percent of its neonates.291 More recent studies show that
parental consent is over ninety percent when parents are
allowed to opt out of screening or even sometimes required to
consent affirmatively.292 A possible explanation for these data is
that a voluntary program that informs and educates parents
about NBS induces parents to ensure actively that their
children will actually get screened.293 By contrast, mandatory
programs—especially those in which parents are not welleducated about NBS—lack this additional “check on the
procedure,” resulting in a lower yield of children screened.294
Interestingly, most parents do not believe that informed, or
sometimes even any, parental consent is necessary for NBS,295
at least with respect to conditions that present in infancy. On
first glance, these findings might cut in favor of maintaining the
status quo. In one study, parents did, however, want choice.296
Nearly three-quarters of parents preferred opting out and a

288. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 45.
289. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 13-109 (West 2013).
290. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132:10-c (2013).
291. Andrews, supra note 2, at 60–61. This study did not investigate an
important question, which is how effective the education efforts are in these, as
opposed to other, opt-out programs.
292. Dhondt, supra note 285, at S106; Liebl et al., supra note 271, at 130–
31; Evelyn P. Parsons et al., Mothers’ Accounts of Screening Newborn Babies in
Wales (UK), 23 MIDWIFERY 59, 62–63 (2007).
293. Liebl et al., supra note 271, at 130–31. One author questions whether
the “consent” procedures in these voluntary programs are truly informed
because consent is given at the time of screening. She suggests that parents
will say yes to anything right after birth, which could result in artificially high
consent rates and could explain why the voluntary programs have such high
participation rates. Harrell, supra note 38, at 850.
294. Andrews, supra note 2, at 60.
295. Elizabeth D. Campbell & Lainie Friedman Ross, Incorporating
Newborn Screening into Prenatal Care, 190 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
876, 876–77 (2004); Faden et al., supra note 80, at 1350–51 (stating that fortysix percent felt that their consent should not be sought); Moody & Choudhry,
supra note 9, at 246–48.
296. Moody & Choudhry, supra note 9, at 244–46.
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little over one-quarter preferred opt-in approaches.297 However,
when asked about mandatory screening for conditions that do
not present in infancy, such as Duchenne muscular dystrophy,
which presents between three and ten years of age, and
Alzheimer’s disease, which presents in adulthood, a majority of
parents opposed mandatory screening.298 This may reflect the
fact that there is little that can be done to prevent these
conditions from developing in the newborn period or at all. On
the other hand, another study found that most parents support
mandatory screening of diseases that present in infancy, even if
no treatment is available,299 suggesting that for some parents
elimination of the diagnostic odyssey, even if nothing can be
done, is important for childhood illnesses.
The fact that parents are not clamoring to give consent for
NBS or that they seem to prefer opt-out over opt-in approaches,
ironically, may support an opt-in approach. The typical reason
for their views is a concern that other parents would not
consent. This supports the findings that when consent is
required, there is actually a high level of acquiescence.300 In
other words, the majority of parents would likely consent to
NBS themselves; they do not want consent requirements
because they fear that other parents would not consent. This
reasoning alone does not, of course, necessarily overcome the
concerns of cost, time, and logistical demands associated with
affirmative consent.301
What further argues in favor of the opt-in approach is the
fact that parents consistently express a strong desire for
education and information regarding NBS, which they are not
getting.302 Overall, studies suggest that parents “were more
troubled over the lack of NBS education than by the lack of

297. Id. at 246.
298. L.E. Hasegawa et al., Parental Attitudes Toward Ethical and Social
Issues Surrounding the Expansion of Newborn Screening Using New
Technologies, 14 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 298, 303 (2011); see also Campbell &
Ross, supra note 295, at 876–77.
299. Hasegawa et al., supra note 298, at 303–04.
300. See supra notes 286–94 and accompanying text.
301. See Elster, supra note 135, at 187–89 (discussing the ethical and legal
issues regarding informed consent).
302. TIMMERMANS & BUCHBINDER, supra note 8, at 61 (“Public opinion
research suggests that few new parents know about newborn screening.”);
Hasegawa et al., supra note 298, at 302. But see Whelan, supra note 18, at 428
(“[A] majority of parents are aware of the initial screening.”).
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consent.”303 Many urge that such education should happen in
the less hectic prenatal, as opposed to newborn, period when
they would be less preoccupied.304 If the goal is primarily to
satisfy parental requests for information, it may be that
requiring affirmative consent is the best way to do that. Studies
have shown that seeking affirmative consent can increase
parental knowledge in the context of research studies.305 In
addition, as noted above, the incentives to provide some
information about NBS are greater with an opt-in as compared
with an opt-out approach. Thus, a powerful justification for
requiring opt-in for NBS itself is to enhance the chances that
parents understand something about NBS, which can satisfy
their desires and likely promote the effectiveness of NBS.
If we could trust that the education would happen in the
prenatal, or even newborn, period, the case for opting in would
be weaker. The current inadequacy of parental education,
however, not only supports the opt-in requirement as a method
to try to ensure that such education occurs;306 it is relevant in
another respect. An opt-out approach is only protective of
autonomous decision making it if is informed refusal.307 If
parents are not adequately educated about NBS, or even worse
that NBS occurs and that they can refuse, the opt-out approach
makes a mockery of the notion of autonomous decision making
and informed refusal. Instead, it merely leaves parents with an
empty legal right to refuse. Even if most parents, when
educated about NBS, would choose not to opt out, many who do
not opt out are not making an affirmative choice because they
303. Hasegawa et al., supra note 297, at 303; see also NEDRA S. WHITEHEAD
PARENTAL ATTITUDES
(2010), available at
http://www.rti.org/pubs/mr-0014-1003-whitehead.pdf (“Most parents would like
more information on newborn screening . . . .”); Campbell & Ross, supra note
295, at 877 (examining the need for increased prenatal NBS education); Faden
et al., supra note 80, at 1350 (providing that around eighty percent wanted to
be informed that NBS was done).
304. WHITEHEAD ET AL., supra note 303, at 6; Campbell & Ross, supra note
295, at 877.
305. Neil A. Holtzman et al., Effect of Parental Informed Consent on
Mothers’ Knowledge of Newborn Screening, 72 PEDIATRICS 807, 811 (1983);
Parsons et al., supra note 292, at 63–65.
306. Campbell & Ross, supra note 295, at 877 (discussing how parents are
strongly requesting the necessary education, especially during the prenatal
period).
307. Newson, supra note 274, at 141 (showing how an informed decision to
refuse consent does not override autonomy).
ET AL., DEVELOPING A CONJOINT ANALYSIS SURVEY OF
REGARDING VOLUNTARY NEWBORN SCREENING 6
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did not know about NBS or the opportunity to opt out.308 In
short, the opt-out approach under the current circumstances is
so far from true consent or informed decision making that it is
hard to argue that it does anything at all to promote
autonomy.309
If providers were to offer the kind of information about
NBS that would make the opt-out approach truly informed
refusal, the process would be quite close to informed consent. At
that point, the distinctions between opt-out and opt-in are
simply not that great. Indeed, studies show that if individuals
are adequately informed, the number who opt in is the inverse
of those who opt out.310 One of the reasons for the opt-out is the
idea of “nudging” people to make the “right” choices.311 Given
that the parent community is, based both on parents’ views and
surveys of parents’ choices, not a community that needs to be
nudged with respect to NBS, and given the added incentives to
educate parents that opt-ins provide, the case of opt-in over optout becomes greater.
While there has been a long tradition opposing an opt-in
approach, the reasons for reconsidering this approach are
quickly growing.312 First, the fact that the broader panel of
diseases increases the risks of false positives or the possibility
of incidental findings of uncertain clinical relevance means that
some of the psychosocial risks of NBS are increasing.313
Parental awareness of NBS may prepare parents for and
therefore decrease the anxiety and confusion associated with
false positives and diagnostically ambiguous results, for
example.314 Parents who understand in advance that NBS is
merely a screening, and not a diagnostic, procedure and that a
positive result is not determinative are less likely to experience

308. Innocent Blood, supra note 138 (explaining that without the proper
education the parents are not truly given the option to opt out).
309. Whelan, supra note 18, at 448 (describing opt-out programs as “‘not a
true model of consent’” but as a mere “‘substitute for consent’”).
310. Liebl et al., supra note 271, at 127 (specifying that lack of knowledge
was a significant barrier to providing consent).
311. Feuchtbaum et al., supra note 195, at 8–10 (discussing the positive
effect of having the option to opt out).
312. Cf. id. at 9 (most states favor the opt-out approach).
313. See Fyrö & Bodegård, supra note 59, at 107, 111 (noting the “persistent
anxiety” associated with false positives); supra text accompanying notes 58–72.
314. See WHITEHEAD ET AL., supra note 303, at 14–19 (describing the
anxiety and depression felt by parents following a false positive).

788

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 15:2

anxiety with respect to a false positive than parents who did not
even know their child was screened.315 To the extent that an
opt-in approach promotes parents’ awareness of NBS, this
approach might function, in part, as a prophylactic to this
concern.
Second, as the panel of diseases screened for expands to
include diseases for which there is limited or no ameliorative
treatment in the newborn period, the rationale for testing
without consent disappears. The entire justification for
screening without consent is the idea that the state is
protecting newborns from suffering the harms of treatable
conditions, which is not true with untreatable conditions.316 In
this instance, as with storing and doing research on DBS, the
parens patriae notion used to justify screening treatable
conditions without consent does not exist. As a result, the
argument for affirmative consent in these cases becomes
significantly stronger.
The fact that there is serious consideration of including
whole genome or exome sequencing in NBS317 should give us
even more reason to be skeptical of opt-out approaches, for both
of the reasons discussed above. Whatever concerns we might
have about expanded panels of NBS with respect to false
positives, incidental and ambiguous findings, and information
about conditions for which there is no treatment are bound to be
magnified considerably by the sheer amount of information that
whole genome/exome sequencing (WG/ES) can generate. Indeed,
for that reason, there is a very strong case to be made against
nudging parents toward consent for WG/ES NBS and a very
strong argument for giving parents affirmative choice—i.e., the
opt-in approach.
Even if one were to argue that opt-outs are important to
“nudge” parents into consenting to testing for serious, treatable
conditions, as states expand their NBS panels to include
conditions for which there are no treatments or WG/ES, this
rationale cannot apply to the full range of screening. Rather
than use an opt-out approach for all of the NBS, it would be
preferable to tier the decision-making process so that there is
only an option to opt out of screening for treatable conditions,
315. See id. at 19 (explaining that information reduced this stress).
316. See Faden et al., supra note 80, at 1350–51 (discussing the support of
parents who believe consent is not necessary for routine testing).
317. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
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and perhaps only for those that express in childhood. Parents,
however, would have to opt in for the rest. Of course, for the
reasons I gave above, I believe opt-in for all NBS is preferable.
Moreover, the administrative difficulties of setting up two
consent approaches for different types of diseases further
argues for a single approach, in this case, opt-in.318 But given
the strong impetus in favor of opt-out for treatable conditions, it
seems extremely important to ensure that consent is
affirmative, and not presumed, when it comes to conditions for
which there is no treatment, especially if they are late-onset
conditions.
Finally, my arguments for seeking affirmative consent for
the storage and future use of the DBS offer a final reason to
advocate for opt-in approaches to NBS generally. Efforts to seek
consent for research and storage of samples would effectively
necessitate a discussion about NBS generally. It is only a
minimal extra step to seek consent for the screening itself.
Some might argue that each new decision that parents are
confronted with or asked to make complicates and slows down
the overall process. It seems difficult, however, to discuss the
collection, storage, and research use of DBS without first
explaining NBS and its purpose, at least in general terms.
Given that parental awareness of NBS is likely to promote
successful NBS, and given that parents want to be educated
about the program, the general discussions about NBS that an
affirmative consent rule would require seem very much in line
with what would be required for a discussion of storage and
research uses. As a result, promoting parental awareness of
NBS through affirmative consent seems well worth the time.
While this might not satisfy the notion of fully informed
consent, it might achieve the best compromise between parental
autonomy and the common good. It fulfills our prima facie
duties to promote individual autonomy, while also honoring our
prima facie duties as a society to protect the physical welfare of
newborns by informing parents about NBS generally and
seeking, rather than simply presuming, their affirmative
consent.

318. Feuchtbaum et al., supra note 195, at 10–11.
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CONCLUSION
As I have argued, the dignitary principle of respect that is
central to autonomy and consent should remain central to all
aspects of the NBS program from the moment the samples are
collected to the moment the state considers using the samples.
While autonomy should not be the overriding principle in
determining what approach to take, there is a risk in deciding
that the state’s interest in helping newborns and advancing
science will run roughshod over the family’s autonomy interests
and the child’s privacy and future autonomy interests in
determining the extent to which he or she wants to participate
in research. As we have seen, many of the public goods may
actually be advanced by approaches that recognize the value of
autonomy and privacy, with appropriate limits, so as not to
hinder the ability to protect newborns or engage in certain
valuable research projects.
Underlying the goal of achieving the appropriate balance
between the public good and individual interests is a third
consideration: the need for transparency when the government
has control over samples with highly personal information.
Whatever balance of autonomy and promotion of research
governments choose, they owe a fiduciary obligation to the
citizenry to act not only for the benefit of the public, but to
assure there is public authorization and transparency. The
public’s trust in the government is at stake in the development
of NBS research programs.319 This argues for educating the
public not only about the existing NBS policies, but also about
new approaches the state is considering so that the public may
share in deliberations over the delicate balance between the
public and private interests. To quote John Rawls, it is essential
for a “well-ordered society” to resolve such difficult matters
based on “the ideals and principles expressed by society’s
conception of political justice, and conducted open to view on
that basis.”320 Until the government does a better job of
educating parents about the full spectrum of issues and
decisions it has made with respect to NBS, this will not be
possible. This article is a call to the states to ensure that they
move toward such openness.

319. See supra notes 249–56 and accompanying text.
320. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 213 (expanded ed. 2005)
(emphasis added).

